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INTRODUCTION 
The importance of the Arab World is well·known. Lying across the 
very center of the old continents and near the fringes of the new Com-
munist domain and with the largest proved petroleum reserves, it i s 
commanding increasing international attention. 
Less well-known is the fact that today the Arab World ia in a 
situation of crisis. It il undergoing the fundamental phase of re-
thinking and reordering the very basil of its life. It finds itself in 
a state of rapid mobility. Ita kings are bowing out, its landlords are 
weakening, its middle class is rising, its intellectuals are restless, 
its workers are growing in number. and its peasantry is beginning to 
move. It finds itself also torn between forces and ideas that lash at 
it from east and west and then there is the potent pull of its ever-
present past. Open to all the winds of thought. it seeks a new anchor 
on which to lean, some new principle of life. a new living law that 
would vivify the pulaes of itl people and brace them against the 
pressure of the outer world. 
Many Arabs today find in the idea of Arab unity the very living 
law that their world is after. and they are pushing it forth with 
increasing vigor into the imaaination and consciousness of the Arab 
people. 
Our thesis will address itself to this idea and will seek to find 
out what chance it has of commanding the loyalty of the Arab people and 
-iv-
what role it will play in their destiny. 
In view of the fact that Arab North Africa (Algeria, Tunie , and 
Morocco) faces problems of a different order and haa not as yet tran-
scended the colonial stage , little attention will be devoted to it in 
this paper. Similarly, the more recent events in the Near East will 
not be touched upon because they are too cloae to be judicio~ly ap• 
praised. The thesis, therefore, will not be carried beyond the early 
1950 ' s. 
v 
CHAPTER I 
THE ARAB WORLD 
With the preaching of the Moslem faith in the Arabian Peninsula 
at the beginning of the seventh century, a process of expansion began 
which was destined to lead to one of the most spectacular human eon-
quests the world has ever seen. Shortly after the death of the prophet 
Muhammed, the forces of the new faith emerging from the heart of the 
· ... ,' .. 
Peninsula pressed forward in every direction open to a land advance. 1 
... .... ~ . ..._ .. 
---·~·N-
This expansion was the result of many factors both external and 
• • _ ... :.t.~oo '" ' ~' •• • •• 
internal. Externally, the two old empires, the Persian and the Byzan-
,. .. - .. --·~ .. ~ ... .. ..._.. .. ~ 
"t____ ------· 
tium, that used to dominate what is known now as the Middle East, had 
reached at the time of the Arab conquests a stage of disintegration and 
decay due to their struggle over the domination of that area, creating 
a political and military vacuum there. 
Internally, behind the conquest there was the expansion of the 
Arab nation driven by the pressure of overpopulation to seek an outlet 
in the neighbouring lands. This expansion was not a sudden and new 
pb@pomenon as might first appear, but it was one of the series of 
migretiona which carried the Arabs time and again into the Fertile 
Crescent and beyond. For centuries before the rise of Islam, Arab 
- -
tribes had poured or penetrated into that area. 
IF---------~-·--~-··-·----"'·· ... _ ----·-.--..--!11!"' ... ,. . ..,. .. ~. ,.,. .. 
1Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 
1946, pp. 14-15. 
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However, the role of religion should not be underestimated as some 
modern scholars have done. Its importance in the conquests, which can· 
not be denied, lies in the psychological change of the people who were 
not used to any kind of discipline and , though willing to be persuaded, 
had never consented to be commanded. The new faith made them for a 
time more self-confident and more amenable to control. In the wars of 
conquest, Ialam was the symbol of Arab unity and victory. 
'------. ________ .... . -----.... -~ ...... -~-----...... .. .-.....---.. ,......,_ ~ .......... , 
In barely one hundred years from the death of Muhammed , the Arab 
conquerors had built an empire extending from Spain in the west, along 
'~-- . · -.": ' ,.. 
the southern shores of the Mediterranean, to central Asia in the east . 
The cultural evolution which the Arabs set in motion in the con-
quered areas was the result of two processes, the one purely religious, 
the process of Islamisation; 
~--- --------·---
the other essentially social, the process 
·~G1 
and \racial of Arabisation which had two aspects--linguistic Arabiaation 
a) 2 Arabilation. 
It will be noted here that Islamisation, essentially a spiritual 
force, progressed much further, while Arabisation, involving material 
displacement, could not always reach the areas conquered by Islamisa· 
tion. Thus two worlds were created according to the two processes: 
I> (W.. - ) 1-ft\/fl\ 
the Moslem world, which is the larger and which contai ned the other, 
the Arab world. 
After reaching its high-water mark, the Arab-Lslamic Empire ent 
a stage of disintegration. This stage of weakness and decay had paved 
the way for many external vigorous attacks. By the eleventh century, 
2Antonius, op. cit., p. 15. 
2 
a new attack came from the West in the invasion of the Crusaders. 
Despite the idealistic aspect of thil movement in the history of 
the Arabs, the Crusaders were ssentially an early experiment in ex-
pansionist imperialism motivated by material considerations with 
religion as a psychological catalyst. 3 
Meanwhile, a new and more dangerous threat to Islam waa arising 
in the E.aat in the vigorous barbarian invasion of the Mongol. The 
Mongolian invaders, emerging from Central Asia, swept through Persia, 
over coming all resistance, and in 1258 Hulaku captured Bagdad, killed 
th caliph, and abolished the Abbasid Caliphate. This was a fatal blow 
- . ... ~\,_ .. _...., ~...-·,"-• • .; ... ~ .... -,.,., •'" . • '' ·~·.· ' ........ ~ •.o.o:«•,:.o • ~-A·-i:-'' •-•~'·:.> . ., ,-, ,•:., •• • <; "• .•, • ' '''.' .' .• ~ ,••'·'·, ., •: ., ' , -~1' •·· ·-\ : •,',' ...... _ • ...,,," -: I - ,,_ • .. ' .. •,•• , .... ,, • .......... .,.~.< · "1~. :.F-': • ~ "' 
/· t~ ~-the Islamic Empire which waa in a stage of weakness and decay t~"· 
make any attempt to resist the vigorous newcomers fruitless and impos-
s i ble. 
The l4ongolian conquest expanded eastward to Syria and then turned 
southward to conquer Egypt, but was stopped by the powerful resistance 
of the Mamluk of Egypt. 
After the fall of the Islamic Empire at the hand of the Mongolian 
conquerors in the thirteenth century, the process of disintegration was 
completed, and no attempt to recover the shattered Empire was made. 
Th only important pow r left in the area was the Mamluk sultanate in 
Cairo, which ruled both Egypt and Syria--a portion of the later Islamic: 
Empire--from the thirteenth century until 1517. 
3tewis, B., The Arabs in History, London, Hutchinson House, 1950, 
p. 150. 
4 
"In 1517 th w ak ned and decayed Mamluk pire crumbled ) ~ 
befor..--cne Ottoman assault and for four hundred years Syria .J /7 
and gypt formed part of the Ot.toman Empire. Soon the Barbary 
States as far aa the frontiers of Morocco accepted Ottoman 
uz ra inty , and wtth the fin l ;,Qt. ~J\-~,0 ~.,}!.t __ '?.f.".~~-ff.l_, .. _f,~~ 
P ra~~n ~iL almost the whole Arabic-speaking world was I ~.1 under: Ottoman rule. n4 { b :). :..7 
Throu hout . the four centuries of Ottoman sway, the Arabic-speaking 
peopl had little in common with their rulers other than r ligion. 
Th. l ng centuries of Ottoman mbrule constitute a loomy chapter in 
' } Arab history . -~he_ former gre t c ntera of Arab eul tur --Damascus, 
I -- . . ...... _ .... _ .. _ . ~·-................... _... .... .... . . 
f B gdsd, Cairo-:-were r educed to the status. of merely provincial ad in• 
~ --~ ---- --. , ........ _ ... ,.-.... , 
{ -~.~~~~-~ .. ~~~~~~ ~..... \ 
Another factor was intr oduced to the scene in the Arab world at \ 
th nd of t he e i ghteenth century--the impact of the West. 
With Bonaparte' s rrival in gypt in 1798, a new chapter i n the 
history of the Arab world beg n . From that _ ti~, th disposition of 
--....,.. -.-·•·-T 'r"-"'"'" · ·:~ ~(!·"" ~,, ... ,_..,, , ,c • .:• •.• ~·.,, •• \._:. ,~ .l· :"- ·,,•-<: t '·~~f'r."" ":"::I ~.:~ .. ,.;_:,~i· :~·,,,...,. •• 
the Mid le Eastern territori s became a major concern of the Great 
Power • 
"During the nin teenth century, Fr nee, Great Britain~ and 
us ia were ll intereetcd in the territories which then formed 
the eas tern . portion of the Ottoman Empire and hich today ar~ 
known as the Middl East. The etate of British and French re-
lations i.n the Lev nt varied in accordance with the temp r of 
the relations between the two on the Continent."5 
Although the French expedition of 1798 to Egypt constituted the 
first Western rmed att ck on the Arab Middle East since the Crusades 
of th eleventh century, it had more significant contequenees in the 
4 Lewi , op. cit., p. 160. 
5The Brooking Institution. 11Security of the Middl !aat: A Problem 
Paper, 11 Washington, D. c., 1950, p. 5. 
/ 
( 
whole lif of the area than merely mil itary conquest. This event began 
the period of direct Wes tern interv ntion in the Arab world with great 
consequences in the economic, social, and political life. 
On the basis of the preceding historical process, we can define 
the Arab world of today as: a gao-cul tural rather than a political 
--------.. --- ~·- -- ~ .... -...... ·- -.... -. -..... -.... -
entity. The "Arab World" h used to indicate the group of countries 
-....,.. ..... 
~......... .... 
in which the great majority of the population has remained impressed 
within the cultural influencee of the dual process of Arabisation and 
Ialamisation generated by the rise and expansion of the Arab-Islamic 
Empire in the seventh century A.D. Thus defined, the "Arab World" com-
prises the continuous chain of countries stretching from the Atlantic 
seaboard in the West, along the southern shores of the Mediterranean, 
to the Persian border in the Ea1t. It includes the orth African coast 
from Morocco to Egypt and the Sudan, the countries of the Fertile 
Crescent--Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Arab Palestine--and the 
Arabian Peninsula. 6 
This "Arab World" il inhabited by seventy million Arabs. But who 
~-------------
are the Arabs? It is not an easy task to define the term Arab in a way 
that would meet with approval of most of the experts on the Arab World . 
Ethnic terms are notoriously difficult to define, and Arab is not among 
the easiest. The term "Arab" has acquired different meanings in dif-
ferent historical periods. According to Professor Lewi1, the term was 
..:....-----------·---·-.,. .... _ _ ______ ,_ . ...__._. 
first used in the ninth century B.C. to describe the Bedouin of the 
~-------·--------------·...- --~--..::.......__ ···~--~ ........... ~-
~--·-~h~Arabian steppe, and it remained in u1e for several centuries, 
----.... 
6Antonius, op. cit ., pp. 13-20. 
5 
in thia sense , among the settled peoples o.f the neighbouring countries. 
To the Romana and Greeks the term was applied to the whole Arabian 
peninsula, including both nomads and settled people. At the beginning 
. ..,..._...._,_ .. ·--"""'- . ...,._ .. .- .. 
of the I lamic conquest, the t erm had acquired a new meaning; it was 
used t o distinguiah the Arabic-speaking ruling clas 
._.....~ .. -.~ ............ -..... . • ......... ,. -·. ~-......... - . ... . , ._. • • •t • • •• ~ .... -. ,~,o ~·~-= ... ~· .. 
of conquerors from 
the conquered masses. However, with the process of Arabisation, the 
- ------ ----·· 
term was applied ~o both conquerors and Arabiaed conqu red. 
Thus the Arabs are the product of a fusion of races along the 
--~------------· 
outhern shores of the Mediterranean Sea and in t he Middle East, which 
took place during the Middle Ages. 
Having considered the various meanings that the term "Arab" 
acquired in different historical periods, who are the people whom we 
can call Arabs today? According to Professor H. A. R. Gibb: 
"A.ll t hose are Arabs for whom the central fact of history 1 
is the miasion of Muhamed and the memory of the Arab Empire, 
and who in addit ion cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural 1 
heritage as their coDIDOn possession. "8 ~ 
It will be noted that Professor Gibb, in his definition, empha-
sized the religious as well as the cultural factors , while Professor 
Lewis in his following de finition adds a new factor, besides t he 
cultural one, the nationalistic ·factor. He defi nes the new usage of 
the term "Arab" as: 
7 
"It is that which regards the Arabic-speaking peoples as a 
nation or group of sister nat i ons in the European sense, united 
by a common territory, language and culture and a common aspira-
tion to political independence. u9 (It r) 
Lewis, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 




In the Arab World, aa in all countries outside Western Europe, 
modern nationalism has been a product. of contact with the West and 
1 
with modern Western civili~ation. Nationalism aa an organised move-
ment in the name of the Arab peoples first developed in Syria in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century when the term Syt;ia embraced 
Lebanon, Palestine, and Tranajordan, as well . aa the contemporary Syrian 
state. Like European nationalism, Arab national eonseiouaneas had its 
origin in a literary renaissance. The ancient elasaical language and 
.. ' . 
the poetical and philosophical works written in it were studied; new 
. . ' 
life and a spirit of romance were breathed into the old traditional 
subjects; foreign classics were translated, and finally the new know-
ledge was sifted and collected in great encyclopaedias and diction-
i 2 ar es. 
It is difficult to ascribe to the several influences at work in 
the Arab World during the latter half of the nineteenth century their 
proper share in the Arab literary renaissance and the rise of the Arab 
movement. Some of the principal factors, however, can be discerned. 
1~hn, Hans, "Nationaliem," in "Background of the Middle East," Ernest 
Jackh, Editor, Cornell University Press, Ithica, New York, 1952, p. 145 
2Kohn, Hans, A History of ationalism in the East . London, George 
Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1929, p. 269. 
-7-
The French conques.t and occupation of f;gypt (1798-1801) ·.:1 inatru-
ntal in transmi.tting ide born o.f the Fr ncb volution an thus in 
giving rise to an indi enous n tionalist class . Th French and Americ 
mission r ieo effected the ame re ul~ in Syria. nod banon. The is-
sion rica and th ir pupil were the fir t who gave modern education 
in Arabic, e t blished printing pr t:o s for Arabic , published ny 
importa. t books and joumols, and united th~ warring ere d 
Arabs by a common ide 1. 
"In 1868 the Amerie n Protestant mission ri a, led by !li 
Smith and Cornelius van Dyek, found d medical faculty at 
Beirut with Arabic a th 1 nguage of instruction. They brought 
to Syria the modern democratic ideas upon which th earliest 
American tr dition ia bas d, nd there sou ht to spread them 
amongst the liberel-minded youtha who flocked to their college. 
Equally important was the filet tha t they ehos Arabic a t .h 
language of instruction in the college, for it thua became 
the the fir t time a medium of communication for dern 
scientific knowledge and modern thought. Here, too, a new 
terminology had to be work d out • . In 1875 rcnch Jesuits 
.fQllnded _ _tb.~ U..n.;l~·~-•-ity_ o~ St. Josep'llit:t-Bi1ruf, ana by eatab-
11 bing e. great Ar bic priritlhg p'teaa ·and pubHahing papers, 
helped to awaken national consciousness and revive a national 
literature, though the spirit in which the University was 
managed was alien to modern thought and aimed at assisting 
French propaganda • uJ · 
With the appearance of a well- dueated and politic lly-minded 
elass, the sc ne was set for the riee of Arab nation li1m, and the 
cond h lf of the nineteenth c ntury abounded with ymptoma of th 
new pirit. Secret societies wer formed, political group• were or-
ganized, and plans were drawn up atming at the realization of Arab 
national aspirations.4 
3~obn, A History of Nationalism in the !aat, p. 269. 
4 Antonius, op. cit., pp . 35-61 . 
8 
The earliest Arab secret society was founded in 1880. Its member 
------.. - ·.······ _, .......... ..... -.................... . 
were for the most part young men who had be n educated at the Syrian 
'---------- . . .. 
Protestant College. They drew up a national program demanding the 
----···- •. adoption of Arabic as an official language, th freedom of the press, 
and th grant of self-government to a united Syria . 5 The society con-
tinued its activities for a considerabl period, but in the end its 
members were forced by the vigilance of the Turkish Seer t Police t o 
close down their society and to take refuge in Egypt and elsewhere • 
....... ! •• . ,.-. ~""~ .... 
The formation of secret societies was followed up by the organi&a-
tion of political parties. 
However, the effective political life of the Arab Nationalist 
r--------+-~~<.l . .u.;,.,;~<;;;iJ..~'"'"\.~I>t;'!.M..s~~..,_'f(.t'rl/. · ,:,~~,:w;< ..... :r.~-..:,.-':.:;....:.A• _. '.,~··~.';fJ< ..,-.;tt:~.iN:A$#·:t.- .:.-. 
Mn·u•~-,.,,,. began after the "Young Turks" revolution of 1908. Arab 
nationalists were greatly encouraged by the Turkish Revolution and its 
ideas of liberty and equality .within the Empire. The grant of a con-
stitution to the Ottoman Empire in 1908 was .at first marked by signs 
of cooperation and fraterni~ation between Arabs and Turks. Thus, in 
September, 1908 the ''Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood" society was formed in 
Istanbul of young Turks and Arab nationalist element•. The object of 
this society was to unite all the races and national elements within 
the Empire to protect the new liberal constitution. Once firmly es-
tabli.shed in power, however, the young Turks proceeded to destroy the 
hopes of all non-Turkish groups within the lmpire by embarking on a 
program of ruthless Turkification. The Arabs soon realized that a 
5
zurayk, Constantine, "The National and International llelations of the 
Arab States," in Near Kastern Culture and Society, Cuyler Young, 
lditor, Princeton University Press, 1951, pp. 206-207. 
9 
partnership between the two races on bases of equality waa neither 
practicable nor genuinely desired by the Young Turks. Their belief was 
strengthened by the ban which the Young TUrka placed on all non:.Turkiah 
societies. Consequently, the Arab nationaliats were forced ' to employ 
underground methods to overthrow the new tyranny of the Young Turks 
that waa in no senae less ruthlese t han the old Ottoman tyranny. · Two 
important secret societies came inco being. Both were the product of 
the growth of Arab national feeling, but each had a different plan -of 
action. The young Arab society of al-ratat, founded in Paris (1911), 
aimed at achieving complete independence for all Arab countries . Its 
members were mostly young Arab intellectuals. The other society, 
al-Ahd (The Covenant), w~~:~ composed of young Arab offic~rs who were 
serving in the Ottoman Army and aimed at establishing a united Arab-
Turkish Kingdom in which the Arab portion might enjoy some measure of 
autonomy. At first the two societies were not aware of each other's 
existence, but later on they united in their support of the Arab revolt 
of 1916. 6 With the outbreak of the Firat World war, the first per iod 
of the Arab nationalist movement came to an end. The chief character-
- ~· .... 
iatics of the Arab national movement during its first preparatory 
- ·-t------···· --~~ .... _., ___ ... , .... "'2' .......... - .. ··-~ - . perio~!t,~S literary foundation•, ~ta predominantly ~;l~~~al· --and 
apiritual char~cter ,+iu v;;;ti-~s for~~~~~~.-- an~ -.- - ;n · ~~n;ral, its 
.... . ..... __ . ...._ .. __...,.. ..................... ~ 
fairly positive nature. 
6zurayk, op. cit., p . 208. 
10 
The Second Period: Struggle for Independence 
The Arab national movement entered into a new phase when the 
Ottoman Empire decided to join the central powers in World War I. At 
the outbreak of the War, two courses of action were open to the Arab 
nationalbt: one was to support the Turks loyally in their war effort 
while insisting upon self-government as a reward for their loyalty and 
cooperation; and the other waa to rise in revolt against the Ottoman 
authorities and to seek independence by allying themselves to the 
enemies of Turkey after obtab1ing guarantees in respect to their poli-
tical future. 7 
Aa early as 1914, the Amir Abdullah, the second son of Hutayn 
Sharif of Mecca, had asked the British in Cairo whether Brit18h support 
would be forthcoming for an Arab revolt against the Turka. Since 
British policy was still one of friendship for Turkey, the answer was 
in the negative. When Turkey finally entered the war on the aide of 
the Central Powers, the whole aituation in the Near laet·was changed 
drastically. The attitude of Sherif Husayn and the Arab nationalbt 
became a matter of iumediate concern to the Alliea, eepecially to 
Great Britain. It became important for the British to win the support 
of Sharif Husayn, not only because it would help war operatlons in the 
Arab countries, but also because the Ottoman Caliph had proclaimed a 
Holy War of all Moslems against the Allies . The Turks, on their side, 
wanted the approval of the Sharif of Mecca of this proclamation in 
7Antoniua, =o-p.._ • .....-::c;..;:i=t., pp. 149-164. 
11 
order to mak it more effective; for the same reason it wae equally 
important to the British that the Sharif's approval should be withheld. 
egotiations wer continued for some time. The Sharif '• endorse nt of 
8 the Holy War was in fact never given. 
The Arab .ationalis& in Syria and Me opot~ia, with whom the Shari 
was in contact, were themselv highly suspicious and distrustful of 
Allied aims in the Middle last as they were opposed to the Turks, and 
it waa these doubts which l ed them to demand fr the British certain 
assurances for the future of the Arab World befor committing thema 1 
further. The Arab demands and the British assurances were contained in 
an exch nge of letters between the Sharif and Sir H nry MCMahon, then 
Briti h High Commissioner for gypt and th Sudan . Th main Arab 
demand was as follow : 
"Great Brit in recogni:ses the independence of the· Arab 
countries which are bounded: on the north, by the line Mersin-
Adana to parallel 370 • and thence along the line Birejik-
Urfa-Mardin-Midi t·Jazirat (ibn Umar) -·Amadia to the Persian 
frontier; on the east, by the Persian fronti r down to the 
Persian Gulf; on the south, by the Indian Ocean (with the 
exclusion of Aden whose status will remain as at present); 
on the west, by the led Sea and th~ Mediterranean Sea back 
to Mere in. u9 
To this Sir Henry replied: 
"The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and portion of 
Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Roms, 
Hama, and Aleppo, can not be said to be purely Arab, and must 
on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation. 
811The Middle East: A Political and lconomic Survey," oyal Institute 
of International Affairs, London and New York, 1954, p . 22. 
9The Sharif Husayn'a Firat ote to Sir Henry McMahon, Mecc , July 4, 
1915. 
Se Antonius, op. cit., App ndix A, p. 414. 
12 
Subject to that modification, and ~ithout prejudice to the 
treaties concluded between ua and .certain Arab chiefs, we accept 
that delimitation. · · · 
A for the regions lying within the proposed fronti rs, in 
which Gre.at Britain ia free tc,> act without .detriment to the 
interest of h r ally Franc , I am author!& d to give you the 
following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, 
and to r. ply aa follol·J to your note: · 
That, subject to the modifications stated above, Great Brita 
is prepared to 1;eeogniae and uphold the independence of the Arabs 
in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the . 
Sharif of Mecca •••• 
That when circumstances permit, Great Britain will .h.lp the 
Arabs with her advice and a aist them in the stablishment of · 
governments to suit those diverse r giona; 
That at regards the two vilayeta of Baghdad and Bossa, the 
Arabs recogniae . that the fact of Great Britain's atabiished 
position and interests there will call for the setting up of 
special adminiatrative arrangements to protect those regions 
from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of their in-
habitants, and to sa£ guard our mutual economic intereata."lO 
The exclusion of .the diatricta of Merain·Adana was accept d by 
I 
th Sh rif, .but not that of the vilayet" of AlepPQ and B irut, and 
considerat ion of this point was left open. 
" •••• we no longer insist on the inclusion of the districts 
of Herein and Adana in the Arab ~ingdom. At for the vilayets of 
Aleppo and Beirut and their weetern maritime eoasts, these are 
purely Arab provinces in which the MOslem is undistinguishable 
from the Christian, for th y are both the descendance& of one 
forefather •••• ull 
lOstr Henry MCMahon's S•cond ote to the Sharif Huaayn, Cairo, 
October 24, 1915. 
See Antonius, op. cit., Appendix A, pp. 419-420. 
llThe Sharif Husayn's Third Note to Sir Henry MCMahon, Mecca, 
ovember 5, 1915. 
See Antonius, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 421. 
1.3 
Following the Hueayn-MCMahon correspondence, the Arab revolt was 
started in June, 1916. Many Weatern writers try to min~ize the impor-
tance of the part played by the Arab revolt in f cilitating an Allied 
victory in the Middle last. However, the benefits for the Allied cause 
which accrued as a result of the Arab Revolt have been attested to by 
those in a position to know. Their testimony is already a part of the 
objective record of the war's history. lfo less an authority than 
General Wavell has declared that: 
" .••• the value of the Arab revolt to the British commander 
was great, since it diverted considerable.Turkish reinfore~ments 
and supplies to the Hijaz, and protected the right flank of the 
British armies in their advance through Palestine. Further, it 
put an end to German propaganda in southwestern Arabia and re-
moved any danger of the establishment of a German eubmarine base 
in the Red Sea."l2 
With the succ~dS of the Revolt and the Allies' victory in the war, 
~- --
Arab hopes were high indeed • It seemed as though their dreams for a 
. ~ ... -.. __.- .. . ... , .. . 
unit d independent Arab State were about to be fulfilled, These dreams 
- -· .. ' - ~ .. .. 
' , .,_. , ,,, ..... ... . 
were soon to be frustrated, however. The peace settlement reached at 
the end of the First World War wa1 a great blow to Arab nationalist 
aspirations. Only the Hijaz, the most backward of the Arab provinces 
which had belonged to the Ottoman lmpire, was given complete and un-
conditional independence, The other provinces were _placed under luro-
·----- --· ..... -~ ~ •.. . ...... - ... ........ ~ -... ,,_ ...... 
pean control. Britain was given the mandate for Iraq, Palestine, and 
--. __ .,..__ - ·· · 
------···· -Tranajordan, while France wa1 given the mandate f~r Syria and Lebanon. 
-----------·~- ' ,.r········ ' ' ' ' • ' - ,.....,. , '· '-~ '''•' •• •• ! •• ...,.. ,. -'r ' : •' · t •• - ,., , • ., . ~-. , • ., ~ ., ~- · 
The results of the peace settlement had an impact on the Arab mind 
which cannot be overestimated. It wa1 more than the fru1tration of a 
12Lord Wavell, "The Palestine Campaigns," London, 1943, p. 56. 
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fond hope ; it was also betrayal by a friend, and breach of fai th by 
someone who had been looked up t o aa a model to emul t • 
The peace settl m nt was n arrangement which satisfied the Weste 
powers but fel l short of what t he rab national i ts h d hoped for . The 
~ Arab nationalists were embitter d by t he whole arr ngement and began 
j~hetr .etruggle to throw off European dominat ion . Conaequently, the 
~ 
\!: p riod between th t wo World Wars wi tness d eoncent ration of Arab 
;-..-"'•M~r.~.·: ~ ... ~. r"'w-_. :-..l'fO?~ ...... ,..'O!W:OO.:'"'N~.....,"'CO,.,..~ •;.ro"""""' ..• ;oo;;~oo:,.:;:.-:n:;r;~ ·:-:"'~1N' -.;-..;-·-·.·y:,- +'~" . .; • .1 ,-4ll!.J':t:l,.~~-.. ~- -.,.-.~- '':1,.;.4i , - · v~ : .. ,,·;~-:.:.. "·'·(.;.~ ........ ,.Y .... o!;t,.«-. .:>:•~ ;; •• - -
f energy upon the at t ainment of independence. One Arab country after 
~:::;h~; -fought · f:~ sel~- ~;~e-;y, 1 ~·h;h,~s~~ry of t h se years, consti-
tutin th econd period of the Arab national movement, ia a s ad e. tory 
of bloodshed and sacr ifice. A whole generation waa born and nurtured 
_ .. -- ---- .. -- --- . -~-·--·~--- ......... - -- . 
. ....... - --·. -
within th resultant atmosphere of suffering, insecurity, and defiance 
~~ .............. . ______ ... _ .... ---- -- -~ - . ~ ·--~ .. ------. ~~-JI...__ .. ,. t• • 
of impoaed· aut hority . evert h l eaa , the war s of i nd pendence of thi 
period were not in vain. By the middle of the century, som ight Arab 
-
States had attained their independence. . Six of th~?.-.a have become me -
b r of t h United Nat ion•• 
_ _ .. ______ -·- • ' - .. ··--. . ... _____ .. __ .-.#, ...... 
In the light of this conei historical sketch of the Arab move• 
nt, rab national ism can be def ined as: 
"The movement which fuses the aspirations of t h Arabic-
speaking peoples for liberation from their own economic and 
social backwardnes and f r om Western domin tion int o a compr -
hensive viaion of revival and modernization of the ancient 
Arab Empir by the union of 11 the Ar ba f r o the Atlantic 
t o the Indian Ocean."l3 
In the light of this definition, it is possible to summarize the 
assumptions and aims of the movement. Arab nationalism ia baaed upon 
13"The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey ," op. cit., p. 18 . 
15 
a communi ty of ent iment. The g neral content of th t sent iment is the 
prid~ in the historic mis ion of Isla , in t h achievement of the Arab 
mpire, and in the cult~ral tradition en hrined in Arabic literatur •14 
Th, , bae;e assumption of the mov m .nt are: /~ir t, t h11t an rab nation 
- ···- ..... -·-· - _,. .. -.. -~ .. ..... . 
can be ere ted. of all who har the Arabic . languag nd cultural heri-
------· -·· · · ~-~------ ···- • • M •0 ~·- .., , ' ' -- 0 0 oO 
~1 ~ 
ta .~ econd , that thi Arab na tion ought to form a ingle indep ndent 
politic 1 ntity , both i n the 1.ntere ts of the nation it lf and in 
tho · of th · world .~ ~hir , that the creation of such a politic 1 unit 
presupposes the dev opment amon th m mb rs of th Ara n tion of a 
consciou nes , not ai 
~---- ·•··· . ...-_, 
ly th t t h y ar member of i t, but that m ber-
- ~-·· -- M-.... -
ship should d termine th ir p litic: 1 deci ion nd loy ltiea. 15 · 
-· 
Th aims of Arab nationalia are to pr serv and enrich the Arab 
cul ture; to n ble the Arabs t o live in the modern world with other 
peopl s, ·nd t o operate within t h rab world with ut unnecea ar y 
brea ing with the past. 
Politically, Arab n tion lis aims at the independence of the 
Arab l ands; th establi hment of some d gr e of unity; th encourage-
ment of national conseiousn ss; and th . reorg nization of the social 
and economic structures of the n tion by me ns of controlled and di -
crtmin ting west r nization. The a pir tion for independ nee and unity 
h 8 b n the common ground on which Ar b n tionalis t of v ry school 
meet; they elicit more popu1 r enthusiasm than any other purpose which, 
14 Gibb, op. cit., p. 28. 
15 Hourani, A., Syria and Lebanon, OXford University Preas, London, 
1946. p. 101. 
16 
16 by the nature of the caae, can have but partial appeal. The Araba' 
aspiration for independence is a natural and logical phenomenon. It 
is the only defense and the only reasonable aspiration they could have 
in a world dominated by the nationalist ideaa. What they deaired bad 
been deaired by the civilized world before them, and baa been formulate 
by the West into a sacred creed and taught to the Araba in Western 
17 history, literature, and polit.ical doctrine. 
However, the attainment of independence after World War II brought 
back to the foreground the object of unity which bad been relegated to 
the background by an earlier generation, and rendered the purauit of 
this hitherto suapended purpose imperative. It ie the purpose of our 
next chapter to examine critically the idea of Arab unity and the 
schemes advanced by Arab nationalists for ita achievement. 
16 Sayegh, F., "Understanding the Arab Mind," The Organization of Arab 
Students in the United States, Mew York, 1953, p. 13. 
17 Atiyab, E., An Arab Tells Ria Story: A Study in Loyaltiee, 
John Murray, London, 1946, p. 191. 
17 
CHAPTIR. III 
SCH!MIS Ol ARAB UNITY 
The unity of the Arabs, like that of most national groups, is 
predicated upon ties of kinship, a common ianguage, common historical 
1 
memories, and a common way of life. In spite of some factore of dis· 
sension and discord in the Arab World today, the elements of this 
reality in the Arab unity movement cannot be underestimated and over-
looked. 
Unity, aa • Izzeddin says, " •.•• is the basic underlying norm in 
the life of the Arab peoples; their division into separate entities is 
2 
a transient phase of recent intrusion." 
The infant movement of Arab unity suffered its serious setback 
after the first World War and the consequent peace settlement. After 
the Arab revolt and raysal's entry to Damascus--the old glorious capi-
tal of the Ummayads--the Arabs thought that their long-cherished aim 
l Issawi, Charles, "The Basis of Arab Unity," International Affairs, 
January, 1955, p. 36. Also Zurayk, C., i n "The National and Inter-
national ltelationa of the Arab States." Zurayk said: "The Arab 
countries posaess a cultural and spiritual unity that is clear and un-
mistakable, though popular writers in the west are apt to overemphasize 
their ppar ent diversity and to overlook the potent tiea that unite 
them. Indeed, the linguistic, cultural, and historical ties that bind 
the Arabs give the entire Arab World distinct and special character-
istics," ''Near Ia tern Culture and Society," ed. Cuyler Young, 
Princeton University Pre a, 1951, p. 205. 
2 lzzeddin, N., The Arab World: Past, Present, and Future." 
Chicago: Henry Regenery Company, 1953, p . 314. 
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of an Arab State would be real i ged . But i ns t ead of a gr eat kingdom 
t hat would comprise the Fertile Creecent and the Ar abian Penins ula , for 
which th y had hop d~ t hey ~f r forced to accept a s t tlement whi ch 
divided t he Fert i l e CreGc nt g th Great Powers . 
Thus the Arab revolt h d failed to achieve it goal of independenc 
and unity . Thie failure, howev r, was the reault of both inte~al and 
extornal factors . 
. Internally. t he movement l-1 s con idered prematur. , aa t he majority 
\/of the p-opl e. except for t he .lit and t h enlightened, wer e unpre -
J 
par d nd inartieul at • The movement had not y~t penet rated into t he ir 
consciou ne !, but hovered on the fring 8 of t he i r l ife . 3 
~) xt~~nally , the movement failad t o t ake into consider a t i on t he 
,.; ----...,_.__..."""'""'·~·· .. 
factor of power politic , and overlooked Britieh and Pr ench i mperial-
i tic ambit i ons in t he Ar b Middle Eaat. 
· ~ 
The ideal ~f unit y did not progre s aa well aB the national i s t 
had fir t envisioned . Thi uas mainly because t he s t ruggl e for i nde-
pendenee was great ly impedt~d by the 1919 settlement . The bl ow t o Arab 
uni ty, however , wa mor e damaging than th~ t emporary withholding of 
indep ndenc • The barr i~rs 1th which Brit i n and rene 
.. --~···· '. • - • • .__ • ........-. • • . .. • ~ ...... • -i.~ , . ~~~.: ·•:.~ _-,.;. ... I<:.·--~~-
Arab World at t hat momen t were new and r t ifie ial, but they tended t o 
...... . ~ .. . . . ·"- . :·· ~ ·- . 
become real ~vith tha pa s ge of time . In eac h n" Arab St t attention 
wa focused on the qu etion of ind pendence and th 1 ediate pr obl em 
of i ts own relat i on wi th t he mandatory power. 4 
3xzzeddin . op. cit., p . 317. 
4Atiyah , Edward, "An Arab Tells Hie 
Jhon Murray, London, 1946 , p . 223 . 
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Story: A S~udy in Loyalties," 
Also, Kamal al•Guali, "The Pact of 
19 
The new tendency of regionalism wa considered by Arab national-
ists as a real threat to their ultimate aim of Arab unity·. It was 
feared that the localized struggle for independence might supplant the 
idea of Arab unity. 
Regionalism might go too far and become too rooted an idea. The 
·- .............. -~·- ... ~-·-·· ' \, .... :. . ... . ·-· ... . .._ .... , ...... -.•. 
people of some regions might lose hold of the common Arab ties. An 
exaggerated regionalism would be disastrous; for no Arab region can 
-----
ever attain alone sufficient manpower or economic strength esaentially 
necessary for its own defense. The Arab World would sink, by its own 
action, into the condition for which the Western powers are blamed--
that of a group of rival little states, unable to unite and powerless 
5 to resist the pressure of the outer world. 
This danger of localism could not be overlooked by Arab national-
ists who tried to combine their efforts to fight this new threat. This 
could be noted in the "Arab Covenant" drawn by the Arab delegates at 
6 
the Islamic Congress convening in Jerusalem in December, 1931. 
5Gibb, ''The ruture of Ar b Unity," in "The Rear laat: Problema and 
Prospects," ed. by P. W. Ireland, University of Chicago Preu, 1942, 
pp. 97-98 . 
6cibb, H. A. R., "The Islamic Congreu at Jerusalem in December 1931," 
Survey of International Affairs, 1934, p. 107. The delegates from the 
Arabic-speaking countries seized this opportunity to hold an "Arab 
Congress " and formulate an "Arab Covenant." Articles one and two of 
this Covenant run as follows: 
1. The Arab lands are a complete and indivisible whole, and the di· 
visions of whatever nature to which they have been subjected are not 
approved nor recognized by the Arab nation. 
2. All efforts in every Arab country are to be directed towards the 
single goal of their complete independence, in their ~ntirety and uni-
fied; and every idea which aims at limitation to work for local and 
regional pol itics must be fought against. 
20 
The Arab Covenant emphasiz d the idea of unity among the Arab 
nations and discredited th tendency of regionalism. 
How ver, there are Arab writers who believe that some a p eta .of 
r egionalis do not contradict the idea of Arab unity, provided that 
together with their loca lized efforts, their aim should ultimately be 
directed tow rds the well-being of the Arab World a 7 a whole. Iti& 
argued th t in strengthening and developing the powers of the local 
unit to the utmost , local nationalism would contribute to the strength 
8 
and power of the greater Arab State of the future. But even though 
regionalism was developing in the Arab World after th first World War, 
nevertheless , the various Arab states were bou..rtd to b drawn closer by 
a n ber of forces operating both from within and from without. The 
revolution_ in transportation and communication drew every p rt of the 
----- ....-~ - . --· .. '.. .. . .. ,, . .. ~ -. . .. ~... . ~ . ··~-···- ~- ... , .,__. .... . . . ....... ~~ .. ., ...... ~ . 
Arab domain closer together. The communication of idea& led to the 
~---~- .. ____.......... ....... ._., .... ~. ... 
-growth of common interests. Th printing press of Cairo supplied read 
ing matter to the whole Arab World and fostered common ways of thinking 
and writing. 
At the same time, the nations of th outside world w r being 
aligned in powerful groups, and the fate of small nations seemed pre-
9 
carious. 
Moreover , in their struggle for independence, thou h earried on 
locally , the Arabs found a unifying force i n their hatred of the 
7Haykal , Yu uf, "Towards Arab Unity," (in Arabic), pp . 32-36. 
8aound Table, Arab National i sm and the War, Sept mber, 1941, p. 703. 




occupying powers •. 
In th first decade followin the first World War and t he frag· 
mentadon of th Arab World, it see d that Arab unity wae a lo t cause. 
------~-.... ~ .... ~-..... ..........._ ...... _ 
The deeir for unit y, however, per sisted . And during the n xt d cade · 
event s moved toward bringi~g t he Arabs·- t t es and peopl e- -closer t o-
A vagu form of unity of purpos and direction beg n to tak 
_ ..... ----~· ___ ......... --'k-... - ...... "" .. ._ .......... __ , ___ ~~- -----·~ .-
On th popular non-official l evel, the trend took the form of 
eulture l On the offici~l 1 vel, th t rend 
,.. ... ....-.-· · 
expre sed itself in th form of treaties of f riendehip conclud .d b 
10 
several Arab stat A t r aty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance was 
sign cl in April, 1936 bet w en lr q and S udi Arabia. Adh renee to thil 
~--·---~-·-·- ... ___ ___......._ . ....... • ·-""-·""" • .•• ,. • ••• •• "' . ~· ····~ 1.• ~ • • ' • 
tr aty, which Yaman join~d in the following year, wae open to any i nde -
pendent Ar ab state. In th same 
Egypt signed a imilar tr t y . 11 
~ ' ' ,.Jo\!.,..·z~:.li•H• 
These eignai" o£ cooperation were reflected in t he international 
cene when the first formal i nternational recognition of a community of 
Ar ab stat ea was aeen in the participation of all the Arab governments 
12 in the Palestine Conference in London in 1939. 
At the outbre k of the second World War the Arab nat ionalis t s, 
t hough i n agreement as t o their national aspirations, were divided with 
10zzzeddin, op. cit., p . 319. 
11The texts of t hese treaties to be found i n 11Documents and Treaties 
in the Arab World," (in Arabic) publbhed by the Syrian Daily "al· 
1936. 
12
''Th Mi ddle ast : A Political and c:onomic Survey ," op. cit •• p . 32. 
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regar to their. all giane to eith r of the two warr in · camp • 13 One 
gr~up a oppoeed t o supporting the two do in tinT powers i n the Arab 
orld, n Brit in-. _t count on lt te 
A:r.i victory, arlld thought th t th ' solution of th Arab que!ltion· lay i n 
takin id with th owe:rs . The other group oppo ed ecist 
ideolosi.e and for saw rav dan r to t he Ar bs from an Axia pen tra-
tion in the M1ddl 14 est. 
Upon th coll~pse of r nc in ·Jun , 1940, th int rn t i onal i'l:ua-
tion in t he Middl e a • wa conaid r ably lt r a.15 y t i time , the 
111 d di st rs and the io~lation of Britain h d hak n the c nfid nee 
of th Middl~ Eastern politician i n Br itain ' s bility t o urvive . 16 
It w-1.· under th circumstanc , and wit h a view to bolat6rin 
it m pos ition . and the pre tige of tho el mcmt a ng th Ar be 
13xhadduri, M. "The Arab League as a Itegional Arrangement," American 
Journ 1 of International La~. October, l 946j p . 760 . 
Different explanations were given as to the attitude of the Arabs 
t ONardo the Allies in the conn World War . Dorothy Thomp o. snid= 
" ••• • World War II appeared in the Near last as it did in the Far !aat 
to b an opportunity to get rid of Eurppean ma ters wbil they were 
again engaged in struggle -with their f :,;.·.:ril~t foe. Some Arab lead ra 
ere even diepos d to cooperate with the German t o that end , not be-
cause they were pro•German. but becauae they were anti-British and 
anti-French, and a sin t the hole postwar dec:f: iont> .•. ," • Latham, 
(e td . } , Crisis in the Middl last, The H. W. Wileon Company, ew York , 
1952 ~ p . 15. 
On th ot her h nd: "Fr om motive of conviction on the p rt of ome, 
of policy or fear on the p rt of other • the free Arab count r ie had 
thrown their w i ght on th side of the Alliea," l.ound Table, ~ 
·ationalism and the War, p . 706 . 
14Ibid . .... . 760 . 
15Cladduri, "Towards an Arb Union ," American Politica l Science Iteview, 
February, 1946 , p . 91. 
16Kirk, G •• A Short History of the Middl e Baat . Methuen and Co., Ltd., 
London , 1948 , p. 196. 
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that were more favorably inclined to the Allied cause, that the British 
government came out in formal support of the Arab aspiratiOJ:l for ''a 
d f it .. 17 greater egree o un y. 
Foreign Secretary Eden, on May 29 , 19~1, said: 
"This country has a tradition of fr:f.endship with the Arabs, 
a friendship that has been prov·ed by deed, not worda alone, We 
have countieas well-wishers among them, as they have many £~tends 
here. Som days ago I said in the House of C0111110n1 that His 
Majesty's Government had great aympathy with the Syrian aspiration 
for ind:pendence. I should like to repeat that now. But I would 
go further. The Arab World has made great stride& aince the 
settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab 
thinkers desire for the Arab people a greater degree of unity than 
they now enjoy, 
In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. 
No such appeal from our friend should go unanswered. It aeema 
to me both natura l and right that the cultural and economic ties 
between the Arab countries and the political ties, too, should be 
strengthened. Hie Majesty's Government for their part will give 
full support to any scheme that coD~;D&nds general approval."l8 
The British Foreign Secretary's statement on Arab unity aroused 
great interest in the Arab world, but the weakness of Britain's milit 
position naturally inhibited the Arabs from taking any action at that 
time. Besides, no definite scheme for unity had then been worked out 
by the Arab leaders themselves, that was capable of general Arab sup-
port. 
Mr. Eden mentioned this fact in the House of Commons on February 
24, 1943 when he sai4: 19 
17Xbadduri, "Towards an Arab Union,'' p. 91. 
18The (London) Times, Hay 30, 1941. ~lao Khadduri, "Independent Iraq." 
19Quoted in ~h.~1dduri, "Towards an Arab Union," p. 92. 
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"As I have already made plain , th British Government would 
view with sympathy any movement among the Arabs to promote 
cultural, or political unity, but cl arly the initiative in any 
scheme would have to come from the Arabs themselvea, So far as 
1 am aware, no such scheme which commands general approval has yet 
been worked out." 
There was, to be sure, a variety of schemes for the unification of 
the Arab lands which, how v r, found partial or feebl support. And 
all of them hurtled against on obstQcle or another. 
These obstacl s stemmed from a complex of tangible and intangible 
probleme resulting from the exietenee of racial and religious minori-
ties and dynastic differencea. These difficulties were further compli-
cated by the varied cultural standardB among the Arab countries, as wel 
as the cl avages resulting from cla a differences which existed within 
each of them. 20 
t The line of thinking of many Arabs had been foremoat in the direc-
J}tion of a unitar Arab State, but the difficulties inherent in such a 
---concept moved some of them to consider, but only as an alternative, the 
.~.~=.__~u.··~f-,.fed.eration. There were other Al:abs, however, who believed 
-•~·--~··r • .. l,.,.,,_}. ·. 'r. 
that neither concept was ~easible at the time, and that only propos ls 
for ~3~onfed~:~tion were likely to yield anything tangible. 
There was also some division of Opinion 1 to the extent of the 
~ 
area which was to be unified. some were for a smaller area with very 
close ties, others for~ loose arrangement e:~~::~n~ ···• l;~ger area. _._ .. , 
.-----.. --.... .,.. .... - -· .... - .... 
20
schact, J., ''Will There Be an Arab Federation," Gr at Britain and the 
!!!£, September 25, 1943, p. 17. 
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Still other thouglt of tightl unified smaller 
conf d rated 21 rea . Th re wa complexity of motive 
ithin larg 
behind ll these 
id Th p opl who advanc d them wer torn b tw en genuin nation 1 
feeling, p rsonal intere t, r sons of state, nd dynastic ambitions. 
Among those who advocated Ar b unity for perao al inter ta w a King 
Abdullah, the late king of Jordan, who, mor t an any other man, aspired 
to le der hip in th Arab l~orld . 
Aft r the dep rtur fro Syri of Feiaal, t h broth r of Abdullah, 
the 1 tt r moved northw rd fr Hej z with vie to attackin the 
French in Syria and revenging his brother's expulsion from that 
22 
country. This ac t ion w pr v nted by Great Brit i , and Abdullah 
was off r d and accepted the gov rnment, subject to mandatory control, 
23 
of the region e at of the Jordan, or Transjordan. From that day, he 
persist ntly nurtur d the id a of gathering under the H ahemit a 
much of the Arab F rtile Cre cent a poe ibl • In the audd n def at of 
Fr 11c in 1940, and th conse u nt w ak ning of ita position 1 Syri , 
2lln considering a practical scheme for AJ;'ab unity, Profeasor H. A. 
Gibb a id: "The solution . as they see it now, ia federat ion. Federa-
tion h a four aspects: cultural, that all the inhabitants of all Arab 
lands shall share in a common type of education, in joint institutions 
for science and learning, and in all other forma of cultural activity; 
eeono ie , that the governments of all Arab lands shall deliberately 
foster mutual economic relations and diacourage and discard if poasible 
11 that would set up economic barriers between them; military. that al 
Arab lands in Asia should have not merely a military alliance but an 
Arab army organized und r a joint general staff; and political, that in 
11 problems of foreign policy and other matters of joint interests 
shall ct as one unit. 11 Ireland, P. W. , (ed.) The e r laat, p. 98. 
For these various eehemes of Arab unity, see the following books in 
Arabie: Ali Naser al-deen, The Arab Cauae , p. 97; M. A. Darwaza, Th 
Problema of the Arab World. p. 185; and Yusuf Haykal, Towards Arab 
Unity, p . 32. Also (in In liah) Muaa Alami, ''l'he Leason of Palestine," 
The Middle East Journal, Oc tober, 1949, p. 391. 
tnotes 22 and 23: See n xt 
he detected a v luabl e opportu ity. This in pir d h to fev r i 
activity. 
n July, 1940 Abdull h nt two notes t o t h rit i sh Government 
expre ln the aapir tion of Syri and Tr n j or an to be reunited into 
one tat • Becaua of th inty of th military ituation, the 
Britia. Governme t eon id r d this plan pr tur .24 
in Abdullah ~aa uns tiafi d. but decided to r l i v t he British 
Gover nt of further rnbarr ssment sine th outcome of th w r was 
still in doubt. .Accordingly, h pr £erred to delay con !deration of 
th whole problem to a mor opportune moment. It wae then , in May, 
1941 . t h t For ign Seer t ary den declared th t the Britieh would up-
port pl n for Arab unity. Thi prompted ing Ab ullah to invite 
Mr . Oliver Lyttelton, MiniE)t r of Stat i n the ear a t, to visit hi 
t n , the Tra Qjordan c pit 1. 
The visit took place i n S ptember, 1941, whore both views on rab 
ffairs wer exchanged. King A dull h ointed out th t Transjord n 
had prov d to be l oyal to t he Allied cause. Ther fore, it shoul d b 
aiven ev ry opportunity and upport to achiev full Syri n unity , 
22Hourani , A. , Syri a and Lebanon, oyal Ins titute of International 
Affa i ra , OXford University Press , 1946, p. 55. 
Al so Memoira of ~ing Abdul l ah of Transtordan, Philoeoph1ea1 Library , 
1950 , pp . 190- 192 . 
23 
. Hourani , .f!?.!$! . , p . 55 . 
241.haddur1 , M. , "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Uni ty," i n ..::.;;;;;;;;...::=:;;;:...=~ 
and the Great Pow rs, • Frye, ( . ) , p. 141 . 
27 
namely, to reunit Syria, Leb non, Palestine, and Transjordan. 25 
Whil King Abdull h obtained no positiv help fro Britain. he waa 
n verth 1 ss given assurances that hit personal endeavors toward yd.an 
26 
unity vould not be obstruct d . He needed to show that th pl n was 
backed by public opinion . On March 5 a d 6 , 1942 number of Arab 
v t ran ass mbl d in Amman and pa s d a r solution embodying a scheme 
27 for Ar b unity. Realizing that the ritish Government would not 
approv any seh me of unity unl ss it satisfied tbe desire of th 
p opl , King Abdullah present d two plana. The 
------· ~ ... ~ .... ~ --~ .. ~-...~ , ..... 
for th rger of Syria, Lebanon, Palestin ) and Transjord into 
- ----·-"'--''' ~ ... ,.-... - ..... ····· ~·~ ..... ..- ..... ;r;.., .. ··taOo-~ ,........,. ,.. ........ ·~'"'-~ ..... --
unita~ s tat with its capital in Damaccu. • Abdull h would beco tb& 
.. ; ..... rwo---·· ·· ~ ... _- -~-( .· .... ,. ...... . , ~:...,.-,,,!);ttJ • 7".''""' ~·1....r,. ·· ~.,.,...-[~o,l.~."' .... 
king of this great r unitary stat • With Syria united, it would th n 
bee possible to join Syria and Iraq in a feder l stat • and the door 
would be left open for the other Arab states to join th federal stat~ 
if they o desired. Th econd scheme differed from the first only by 
25 Khadduri , op. cit •• p . 142. 
King Abdullah' plan was known aa Greater Syria . A. Hourani~ in his 
book yria and Lebanon, defined thia term as follow : "In the past it 
h often be n used to refer to the whole are str tching from the 
Taurus MOuntains in the north to the Sinai peninsula in the south, and 
from the Hedit rranean Sea on the west to the Syrian Desert on the 
east . 11 P. 4. 
Con id ring th possibility of union in this area. Hitti wrot : 
·~ot only the geographical but th historical coneid ration are favor-
able to a union . These eon•ider tiona center on the conaciousnes of 
a COIIIDOn heritage , U.nguiatic and cultural. and the awareness of a 
cODmOn glorious past •••• " . Annual Report of the American Hi torical 
Aasociation, Vol. III, p . 153 .. · 
26 Ibid • ., p. 142. 
27Th Journal of th Middl East Society, It 1947. pp. 110·112 . 
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providing for a federal state inside Greater Syria rather than a 
28 
unitary one·. 
lting Abdullah's proposal ia of great importance in view of the 
fact t hat it ·repres·enta, with emendat i on, the sentiments of Arab 
nationalists. It 1a similar to the plan submitted in 1943 by uri 
as-Said. the Iraqi Prime Minister, to the British Minister of State in 
29 Cairo , Mr. R. Casey. This plan, better known in the Arab World as 
the "Blue Book," consists of a ''Note on Arab independence and unity 
with particular reference to Palestine." Kuri aa-Said'a proposals may 
be summarized as follows: 
"1. Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan to be reunited to 
constitute one state. 
2. The people of that state to decide its form of government, 
whether they have a monarchical or republican regime, or 
whether it be a unitary or federal state. 
3. An Arab League to have a permanent Council noainated by the 
member states and presided over by one of the rulers of the 
atates, to be choeen in a manner acceptable to the states 
concerned. 
4. The Arab Council to be reaponsible for: (a) defense, (b) fore 
affairs, (c) currency, (d) communications, (e) customs, and 
(£) protection of minority rights. 
28The text in Jalal al-Orfali, "Iraquian Diplomacy and the Arab Union," 
(in Arabic), pp. 221·229. 
Abdullah based his claim to the throne of Syria upon the following 
considerations: (l) the promise to that effect accorded him by Mr. 
Churchill in 1921, then Secretary of State for the colonies; (2) 
accession from hi father he claimed the right to govern this area; 
(3) his legal status in Transjordan which is considered as an integral 
part of Greater Syria; (4) the desire of the Syrian people for the 
constitutional monarchy form of government aa witnessed by the resolu-
tions of the Syrian convention of March 8, 1920. (See Appendix lour in 
Memoirs of King Abdullah of Tranaiordan, p. 263~ 
29Kbadduri, . Independent Irag, !loyal Institute of International Affaire, 
Oxford University Preas, 1951, p. 252. 
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6. The Jews in Palestine to have semi-autonomy, and the rights 
to their own rural and urban district administrations in-
cluding schools, health institutes, and police, eubject to 
general supervision to the Syrian state and under inter-
national guarant 
1. Jerusalem, a city of which membere of all religions must have 
free acces for pilgri ge and worship , to have a apocial 
commission composed of the three theocratic rel igions t o 
ensure this r esult."30 
!arl y in 1943 Nuri as-Said aasumed the l eading role among Arab 
politic ian• working for unity. His plan was ,enthusiastically rec ived 
among Arab nationalists in Syr i a and Iraq because: 
"Tha people of these two , cou~tries had most understanding 
of Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and most enthusiasm for 
and belief i n th m •••• We find also that the history of the 
Fertil e Crescent from the first Islamic period was baaed on 
uni ty and tho cohesion of ita p3rts , and that unity ia, the basis 
of ita continued ~iatence. Parti tion is imposed on it ex-
t ernally . uJl 
The coming of Egypt into the sphere of Arab politics completely 
altered th scheme of Arab unity propoaed by Trana jor dan and lraq .32 
lgypt, which fo~rly pursued an independent nationalism of her own, 
realized that it would be advantageous if she led a bloc of several 
Arab states in the postwar period. 33 The Egyptian Government might 
hav been encouraged by Great Britain to take t he leadership of Arab 
unity movement , but the new circumatancea of the War must have made 
the !gyptian politicians r alize that economically and culturally, as 
30~dduri , Independent Irag, op .cit •• p . 253. 
31Alami, Musa, "The Lesson of Palestine," The Middle !ast Journal, 
October, 1949, pp. 390-391. 
32Xhaddur i , The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity, p. 140. 
33~amal al-Guali, The Pact of the Arab League (in Arabic), p . 31. 
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well a politic lly, it would b of .benefit to lgypt to cooperate ~ith 
' 34 
the Arab countr i es . 
e lizing th importnnc that Egypt could attain by aa uming the 
1 der hip for Arb unity, . ah Pasha , the !gyptia rime Minit ter, 
h ld a s ri s of conv r ation on Ar b unity with Arab leaders. Rep• 
r sentatives of Syria, banon, S udi Arabia, lr q, and Yaman p rtiei-
p ted in th s conversati ns, wltieh laot ed f r om Augu t until ov mb r , 
1943. 
In April, 1944 the lgyptian Gov rnment mad arr nge nts for th 
meeting of a Pr p ratory Committee to be attended by the Arab countriet 
that participat d in the initial conversations of 1943. 
1944 has Pasha opened the meeting at the Antoniadea Palace in Alexan-
dria .35 Before them eting it as felt that nn Arab conference wi 
a Palestini n del gate ould b 11a contradiction i n terms." An invita-
tion was accordingly extended t o Palestin to tend a representative. 
Musa al-Alami waa chosen to pr ent the Pal tin Ca e b fore the 
36 Preparatory Committee. 
I n his opening speech, ah s Pasha dec l ared that the delegatee 
were fir t to be asked to out l ine their views on th scheme of Arab 
unity that were reached durin the pr l iminary eonvere tions. The 
Conmittee was then to proceed to work out a general scheme which could 
34Cladduri, The Arab Leagu · Arrangement, p. 763. 
351hadduri, Towards an Arab Union, p. 96. 
36Ahmad Musa, The Pact of the Arab League (in Arabic), pp. 16-17. 
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be ace ptable to nll. 37 
The Prep ratcry Committee held eight meeting from September 25 
38 
unti l Octob r 7, 1944 . 
In con iderin che for Arab unity ace pt l to ll, th 
co itt r lized t h t full uni on, with cen r 1 executiv authority, 
w ossi l for t h mo nt. Only Syri at ood f r full~fl dg d Arab 
unity. whil Ir and Tran j oxd~n advocated union on federal basis . 
Le anon asserted h r ind p ndene but pl~dged coop ration with the 
other Arab countric . S udi Arabia and Yacan r luctantly agreed t o 
~ ociation of ind p ndent· Arab state~. ypt, who took 
the r ol of the diato , did not ny d fi ite plan of unity , 
but N las Pa ha d cl r d that hi overn nt w pre ar d t ace pt 
39 
plan approv d by ll. 
he Gr at rSyri , which wa · advocated rli r by ~ing b-
dullah , w s fully and fr n ·ly discus ed at th sixt b ting of th 
Pr paratory Co ittce. The Syri-n and Tran jord n d le at a unh i-
tatingly welcomed th propo~al. Trana jordan accepted the plan only on 
condition th t King Abdullah would b the king of th n state, while 
Syria u ported th project: but pr f rred to mai nt a in h r r publican 
r gi L banon was not r dy to join ·uch ... union, and P leetine'e 
po ition i3 c plicat d by the Zionist cl ims . Thu th Gr ater Syria 
'37 Kh dduri, Independ nt lr g, p. 254 . · 
38Ahmad Muaa, The Pact of t he Arab League, pp. 12•13. 
39 Kbadduri, Independ nt trag, pp. 254-255. 
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scheme was receiv d with mixed feelings by the Preparatory Committ 
and dismissed as premature in the xis t ing circumstanc s.40 
Th latt session of the Co ittee wa devot d to th promulgation 
of th · Al x ndri Protocol which summarized the unifi d obj ctives of 
the confer s. The protocol w signed by all the d 1 g tes, except 
for th repr s ntatives of Saudi Arabia and the Yaman, who did not have 
th pr r qui it authority. Later they signed the protoc:ol .. ·Saudi 
Ar bi on January 3 , 1945 and Yaman on February 5, 1945.41 
Th pre mble of the Al x ndria Protocol stressed the d ire of 
th- con£ rring states 11 •••• to trengthen and consolidate the tie which 
bind all Arab countrie and to direct them toward the welf re of the 
Ar b world; to improve ita conditions; ensure its future; and realize 
it hopes and aspirations ." Thy recognized tbe strong desire for 
unity enwnating from the peopl e, for the preamble admit s that the draw· 
ing together of the Arab states was " •••• in reapona to Arab opinion 
1 b .~2 in al Ar Countries •••• 
Th Alexandria Protocol consists of five items, the firet of which 
provide for the cr ation of a League of Arab States ~ 
"A League will be formed of the independent Arab states 
which consent to join the League. It will have a Council which 
will be known as the Council of the League of Ar b Stat a, i n 
which all participating states will be presented on an equal foot-
ing." 
40Khadduri, Independent Irag, p. 255. 
41 AhmadMusa, op. cit . , p . 13. 
42The Text of the Al exandria Protocol was published in al-Ahram (Arabic 
daily of Cairo) on Oct. 8, 1944. A translation to the text is to be 
found in The Arab League in Perspective by Cecil A. Hourani, published 
by The Arab Office, Wardman Park, Washington, D.C., 194~. Al ao in the 
Depart ment of St te Bulletin, 18 , 1947, p. 966. 
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Th council would execute asreementa reached by the states among th~-
selves. The decisio~&of thil council were to be binding upon those 
itates which accepted them, except in easel wb6r conflict h d arisen 
between two member states, which would then hav to · ccept the council' 
decisions. The use of force in settling disputes bet e n member states 
wae to be forbidden. The protocol laid dawn that mber state would 
have the right to mak agr ementa with other states in or out of the 
League, so long as such agreements were not contrary to the text or 
the spirit of the League ' • constitution. HoWever, the protocol made 
the important provision that " •••• in ·no eaee will th adoption o a 
foreign policy which may be prejudicial ·to the policy of the League or 
of an individual member stat be allow d." 
Item two of the protocol provided for cloae coop ration b twe n 
member states on economic, cultural~ and social probl ms, and recom-
mended the setting up of commissions of up rta in c field to elab-
orate a program of joint action. 
The third item of the protocol recogniced that the ~ormation of 
the Arab League represents only one step toward unification. It states 
that " •••• while expres ing it satisfaction in auch a happy tep, the 
Commi tte hope• that the Arab states will be able in the futur to 
consolidate that step by other steps." 
The last two items of the protQ.C.Q.l-deal. wUh the two special 
... --... ··h_ .. ,___.. . - - ....... ._ ... , 
___ ........ • ____ , ... _,._._~ .... -~-- ··~ •• • ~ ....... ; ........ 11 
--...,..· .. ·: .. 
resolutions: the first reaffirmed the independence of Lebanon in its 
_., I • • ._, ,_,.,,...,_., ,_ , :...>c,-""'"'.._ ... Vw_ ,. t" •.,.,, It; '• $'..•._•, . .... 
pre~nt frontiers, while the other makes the problem of Palestine once 
... -~ . ',' .. . ~·~ .. .: .. \.:.~. ,. ·-~ ··~"" ... ··•'':" ....... .... ___ h ____ ___ •••••• 
and for all the r sponsibility of the whole Arab world. 
I t should b not d t hat in spite of i to sub titut ion 1 t r by the 
actual P ct of th Ar b League~ th Alexandria Protocol will continue 
to pl ay an 1 portant r ole in th mov ment of Arab unity. It 
lieo i n t he fact that it wa strongly popular doc n t t 1 ng 
constantly to "public opinion throug out the Ar b Worlds " "the Arab 
people .... ," an "th Arab e.tion ." It r cogni z d th t t h propos d 
Leagu wa only a first s tep t~J r d a clo r union . It nvieag d a 
co n ori entation of th Ar~b countries towards the utaide world. 
They were t o fac in one dir ction only, nd not . to div r in th.ir 
43 
foreign policy . 
43 . Hourani, C.,'The Arab League in Perspective," The Middle last Journal 
April , 1947, pp. 131-132. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TH! ARAB LI.AGUI AND ARAB UNITY 
The Alexandria Protocol provided for the establishment of a sub-
committee to prepare the draft pact of the League. The subcommittee 
1 held sixteen meetings (February 14 to March 3, 1945) and prepared a 
draft pact which was more elaborate but did not differ essentially in 
substance from the Protocol. The draft pact was to be submitted to 
the Preparatory Commit tee which met at a general Arab Conference in 
Cairo on March 17, 1945. The general Arab Conference discussed the 
project submitted by the subcommittee and at the last meeting on 
March 22, 1945 the delegates of lgypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Trans-
jordan signed the pact of the Arab League. Saudi Arabia signed the 
2 pact in the same month, while Yaman signed it later, on May 5, 1945. 
Under Article 20 the pact was to come into force fifteen days 
after the Secretary-General had received the instrument of ratification 
from four states. On May 11, 1945 the League legally came into exi st-
ence after lgypt, Iraq, Transjordan, and Saudi Arabia had deposited 
3 
their rat ifications. 
l Ahmad Kuea, The Pact of the Arab League , (in Arabic), p. 14. 
2 15. Ibid~, p . 
3 16. Ibid., p. 
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The Pact of the Arab League consiats of twenty articles and three 
4 
annexes. 
Article one specifies the membership to the League. It states: 
"'rhe League of Arab states is compos.ed of the independent Arab states 
which have signed the Pact. Any independent Arab state has the right 
to become a member of the League. 5 This article accordingly bars the 
membership of non-Arabic Near lastern countries. 
Article two deals with the purposes of the League. "The object of 
the League shall be " •••• to strengthen the ties between the participant 
states, to coordinate their polit ical programs in such a way as to 
effect real collaboration between them, to preserve their independence 
and sovereignty, and to consider in general the affairs and interests 
of the Arab countries." Besides this political object, a further one 
a hall be " •••• the close collaboration of the participant atatea, in 
accordance with the regime and conditions prevailing in each state in 
the following matters: (1) lconomic and financial affairs; (2) communi 
cations; (3) cultural affairs; (4) matters relating to nationality, 
passports, and visas; (5) matters relating to social questions; 
(6) matten relating to public health." 
4The text of the pact appeared in al-Ahram (Cairo) March 23, 1945. For 
an l~gliah translation of the text see the Arab Office , Washington, 
D. C., The Arab League in Perspective, by Cecil Hourani, Appendix 2. 
Als~ the Department of State Bulleti~, May 18, 1947, pp. 967- 970 . 
5In accordance with this article L)b.' i:a joined the League after the 
proclamation of her independence on .. December 24, 1951. 
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Article four provides for the establiahment of a special committee 
to deal with each of the que•U.ons liated in article two. The member 
stat s should be represented in these eonmitte a. 
Article three deals with the instruments of the League. "The 
League shall possess a council composed of the representatives of the 
member states of the League, each state shall have a eingle vote, irrea 
pectiv of the number of its representatives." The council ie the 
final authority of the Leagu in all matters and it " •••• shall be the 
council's task to decid upon the meant 'by which the League is to 
coop r te with international bodies, in order to guarantee aecurity 
and peace and regulate economic and social relatione." This article 
makes th Arab League, as far as its relation with the United Nations 
is concerned, a regional organization in accordance with Chapter Eight 
of the San Francisco Charter. 
Article five bars resort to forcible measures between the member 
states. lt gives the council the power to mediate differences and 
declares binding any verdict by the majority of the council. Article 
six treats of the circumatances that may necessitate the convocation 
of the council for an extraordinary session. It liats these circum~ 
stances as aggression or threat of aggression. Article aeven. which 
ia considered a weak one, makes unanimous decieiona binding on all, 
while majority decisions are binding on those who vote in favor of the 
deciaion. Article eight binds a member of the League to reapect the 
systems of government of other members, and to abstain from any action 
calculated to change these established syetems. Thia article pr1e•1~LP~.~ 
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is intended to militate against ~ing Abdullah's project of Greater 
Syria. However, article nine permits the . ~mber states to establish 
closer relations among themselves if they 10 desire. Thil article has 
a significant ~portance amang those who advocate Arab unity as it 
leaves the door open for cloeer union among the Arab states. Cairo is 
decla.red to be the permanent seat of the League, according to article 
ten. The council may, however, auemble at any other place it may 
desire. Article eleven provides for the regular aemiannu 1 sessions of 
the council: one in March and the other in October. The call for an 
extraordinary session must be approved by at least two members. 
Article twelve deals with the Secretariat and the staff of the League. 
The Secretary-General ia appointed by a t wo-thirda majority vote of the 
council. 
Article t hirteen requires the Secretary~General to prepare the 
budget of the League. Article fourteen extends diplomatic immunities 
to the whole Secretariat and the members of the council. Article fif· 
teen deals with the relation of the presidency of the council among ita 
members. Article sixteen binds majority decisions on the members of 
6 the League on procedural matters. Article seventeen requires all 
members of the League to deposit copies of unilateral treaties with 
the Secretariat of the League. Article eighteen provides for withdrawa 
6Procedural matters are defined as: (a) questions relating to per .. 
sonnel; (b) adoption of the budget of the League; (c) establishment of 
the administrative regulations for the council. the committee, and the 
Secretariat-General; (d) decisions to adjourn the aeuiona. 
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of a member state by notifying the council one year before s uch with-
drawal is to go into effect. This article was criticized by Arab 
nationalists as it makes it po sible for the memb r statea to withdraw 
and, therefore, constitutes a weakness of the League. This provision 
did not exist in the Alexandria Protocol and was inserted at the in-
sistence of Lebanon. The same article provides also for the expulaion 
of a member state which fails to fulfill its obligations under this 
Pact. Article nineteen declares that amendments to the Pact would be 
effective if passed by a two-tairds majority , but if a state does not 
accept such an amendment, it may withdraw from the League. Article 
twenty declares the Pact to be operative fifteen days after the 
Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification from 
four states. 
The first annex of the Pact deals with Palestine. It states: 
"The nations signatory of the Pact are of the opinion that, cons idering 
the special circumstances of Palestine, the council of the League 
should take char~2 of the selection of an Arab representativ from 
Palestine to tak~ part in its work." The second annex provides for 
the cooperation of the League with Arab countries that have not yet 
achieved independence (referring to Borth Africa) and enjoina the 
council to work on their behalf. The third annex appointed Abd-al -
l&hman A&zam to the post of Secretary-General of the Arab League. 
According to Arab nationalists, the Pact of the Arab League ia a 
weak document. Although the Pact follows the general principles laid 
down by the Alexandria Protocol, it was in some respects a leas strong 
doc nt. Th Pact af uards re carefully nd mor 
th sov r ignty and ind p ndenc of t he member stat • while the 
Protocol had nvisaged a progressively iuc:reasing surr nder of ov-
reignty. 
Th P ct omits the clause of th fir t item of th Protocol which 
stat d that " •.•• in no ca e will the adoption of for ign policy which 
may b pr judicial to the policy of the League or an individual member 
state be allow d ." The Pact~ in articl ei ht ~ pecifically binds ach 
member otate not to interfere in t he systems of government of the other 
me ber states, while the Protocol had no such provi ion. 
Although there i a general greement among Ar b nationaliets that 
a kind of unity is nee ssary among the Arab nation • ther is no com-
plet agr ement as to whether the Arab League ia the beet method of 
achieving this aim. Arab nat ional ists who believe in the nee ity of 
an Arab federation or even a unitary Arab stat argue that by preaerv-
ing intact the ov reignty of th member states, the L ague tends to 
pr serv pecial interest and to crystallize into permanent form the 
pr sent pol itical divis iono. Moreover, by providing a loos form of 
unity . the League y t nd to satisfy many Arabs that th goal h,a been 
reached , putting an end to their e ffort to achieve a stronger form of 
unity. 
Representing thi point of view, Musa a l-Alami s ya: 
"It is true that w attempted to achieve a kind of coopera-
tion and grouping together by forming this League as a step 
toward unity. But th~ attempt failed, the evils of partition 
remained, and the Arabs continued to meet and to disagree. More 
than that, they split into two rival campi, and t he Lea ue was 
unable to remove the causes of rivalry--it was, indeed, itself 
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ne oft c use . Thi· w bec · u ita c rt r a bas don 
the preservation of the status quo, which is based on partition 
an · on th~ trength is o· the littl sta~ s •••• Thu it is 
impoasible to reach r eal unity along the path of evolution in 
the L aguc ..•• "7 
Other Arnb nationalist argue that the inclu ion of all the inde-
pendent Ar b state in th L gu , nd · it con equ nt nt rnational 
t t• , compensate& forth isadvaritages in its inherent weakne a . 
reover, they ·nrgu that a though the League do ot realize the 
i deal o£ Arab unity, it oea t •o things which, ap rt from the r imm di-
t ben fit, i ll help to bring about a closer union in time: first, 
i r affir and ymbolize~ th on nea ·of the Arab World against the 
perati t fore 
it e .. tabliGhe 
ere ted into it by th 19 9 ; ttl ment; and aecond, 
8 
machine y for commun action . 
it is generally &greed th t: 
" . •• • the Arab Leagu i r ther a tag in series of 
developments which is by no means ended .••• It may be regarded 
a th first import nt at p in the dual proce s of Arab unif -
cation and liberation since the Arab ~evolt of 1916. It is to 
o. extent, indeed , a continuation of that unful illed revo-
lution."9 
It should be noted that after the signing of the Pact , the Arab 
League appeared a we ker instrument than that which Muri as-Said's 
federative plan had envisaged. The Arab League is not a federal union, 
7Al mi , Musa , The Middle ast Journal , p . 389 . 
8At iyah. .; An Arab Tells His Story , p. 224. 
9nourrani , Cecil, "The Ar·b Leagu in Perspective, " op . cit ., p. 125. 
Mejla Izzedi, in h r book Arab World, considers the Arab League ae: 
"The Ar ·b League is t o be und rstood a& n exp e sio. of th evolution 
within Arab society towards unity, an evolution in line with wor l d tr 
toward int gration and unifie tion , " p . 327. 
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since the latter is composed of several states with a central govern-
ment possessing power not only over the member states, but also over 
their citizens, and to which, from the international point of view, the 
10 
conduct of all foreign relations is confided. 
It is obvious that the Arab League does not possess such power and 
authority. The independence and sovereignty of each member state, as 
expressly stated in the preamble of the Pact, are safeguarded and any 
member state can withdraw from the League if it so desires. 
According to Oppenheim, ·~he Arab League may be eaid to possess 
the legal nature of a confederation. S~ch a union it composed of inde-
pendent states, held together for the maintenance of their external and 
internal independence by international treaty. The member states agree 
to forego part of their liberty of action in favor of an organ of the 
union whose power would extend only over the member states. In con-
trast to a federation, the confederated states do not constitute an 
international personality, since the member states remain full sovere 
states and separate international persons."11 
As the Pact makes it possible for the member states to establish 
closer cooperation and stronger bonds among themselves, the Arab 
League may be compared with the Germanic Confederation which was formed 
by the Vienna Powers in 1815. The Arab countries aapire, as was the 
fate of the Germanic Confederation, to achieve further unity by turning 
10 Oppenheim, L., "International Law," Lauterpacht , H. L., (!d.), 
Vol. I, p. 160. 
11 Ibid., p. 159. 
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the League into a Gort of Arab f deration. 12 
Since it• establ ishment, the Arab League baa b en seized with 
b ic problems pertaining to Arab independence and unity. 
The firat political problem that the L ague had to face was the 
13 Franco-Syrian - Lebane e dispute. The l'rench authorities in Syria 
nd Lebanon were conducting negotiations with two Arab epublics in 
April , 1945 for conclusion of treaties that would give rro.nce a privi-
l ged position in the L vant. Both the Syrian and the Lebanese Govern-
menta rejected the French prop sal for such a treaty. The position 
assumed by the two small state was greatly at~engthoned through their 
rcognition ao fully independent state.., by Great Britain, the United 
14 States, and the Soviet Unioxt. As a measure of threat and intimida-
tion, the French. saw fit to strength n their forces in the Levant and 
15 French troops landed in Beirut. The Syrian and Lebanese . Governmenta 
were alarmed by French action and requested the convocation of the 
16 
council of the Arab League . 
l2Khadduri, The Arab League aa a •egionai Arrangement, p. 770. 
l30n September 28, 1941 the independence of Syria waa proclaimed by 
General Catroux following the entry of the forces of l'ree Prance and 
Britain to Syria and Lebanon. The independence of Lebanon was pro-
claimed on November 26, 1941. However, after these declarations , Prenc 
forces remained in Syria and Lebanon waiting for the outcome of the war 
and its consequences on the status of Syria and Lebanon. 
14Great Britain recognized the independence of Syria in October, 1941 
and that of Lebanon in December, 1941. The United States recognized 
their independence in September, 1944 and the U.S.S .R. in July , 1944. 
15Izzedi~ op. cit., p. 163 . 
16aew York Times , May 23, 1945. 
Th~ rel ~ions betw~en Fr md the Lev nt State took a turn 
for t he woro , fighting broke out on lar~e seale , and th ranch, 
fou- th ~ cond time in th ir c r er a.:. CJ> mandatory pow~t· , subjected 
Da scus to h~avy bombard nt. 17 an h!l~, th council of the Arab 
1 League ~a c~lled to convene in an emerg ncy s s ion for June 4, 1945. 
The det erior tion of th 1tu tion in the Lev nt n rly precipi-
tat d eriaia .bet en Gre t Brit· in nd FrancG. On 31, 1945 Prime 
Mini teiC Churchill informed Gen -rnl de G uDe th t i n th interest of 
the Midd1 a t s curity he h·l.d ordered the chief commander of th 
Middle Euat to interfere in th violent conflict nd prevent the future 
~h dding of blood. To void col li ion betw en Briti h nd French 
troop , de G ulle was a ked to order the French troop t o c fir 
19 
at once . Under the eire , the r~nch authoriti~ h d no 
.lt r n tiv but to ace pt the British ultimatum. 
In a s ns , the me ting of th council of the Arab a ue was au 
anticlimax in t he L vant dispute. How ver, it 1 import nt bee use it 
repr ent d the fir s t ct of co peration between the Arab states i n 
the ir new or ganization . Th counc il of the Arab Le gue met four times 
during June , from June 5 to a. 1945. and dopted resolution demanding 
the t t 1 evacuation of foreign troop from Syria and Leb non. 
17The first time was in 1925 when the Syrian revolt broke o.ut. 
18It should b noted that t he League came legally into force on May 11, 
1945. The League had t o deal with this political problem after a few 
weeks f its legal exiatene • 
19 Izzeddin, op. cit., p . 163. 
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It should be noted that the Franco-Syrian-Lebanese crisis passed, 
owing to the support given to the Levant states by the Great Powers 
when the case was taken up by t .he United !Cations, and thus the Arab 
20 League was spared the effort to face the cria is alone against France. 
Hardly had th Syrian crisia passed when the Arab League was con-
fronted with another issue that revealed the dynastic rivalry among the 
member states. The Greater Syria isaue, which was advocated by ~ing 
Abdullah before the establishment of the League, was again stimulated 
in 1946 . Having achieved independence for his country, 21 King Abdullah, 
who never gave up his Greater Syria project, made a specific reference 
to the plan in an official address to his legislative chamber in Novem-
22 ber, 1946. The formal announcement of King Abdullah's Greater Syria 
scheme as the official policy of his government aroused the opposition 
of both Syria and Lebanon and revived the controversy in a more acute 
23 
manner. The reaction of the Lebanese was immediate. On ovember 13, 
1946 Lebanon'~ Foreign Minister, addressing the chamber of deputies, 
made it clear that Lebanon had joined the Arab League on condition that 
her independence and her existing boundariea should be maintained. He 
2
°Khadduri, Independent Iraq, p. 258. 
21on May 14, 1946 Transjordan was proclaimed an independent monarchical 
state. On May 25, 1946 Abdullah was formally proclaimed the first ~ing 
of the Hashimi Kingdom of Transjordan. 
22 lxtracts from King Abdullah'• apeech to be found in a book entitled 
Greater Syria, edit~d by a number of Syrians, Damascus, 1947, p. 14. 
(in Arabic). 
231hadduri, The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity, p. 145. 
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denounced King Abdullah's plan ~~ being inconsistent with th policy 
24 
which prompted I.ebanon to join the Arab Le gue. Syria's ra ction to 
tt.ing Abdullah's plan was violent, too. Syria's oppoaition was not 
based against the idea of strong unity between the Ar b states. It 
should be recalled that Syria stood strongly for full Arab union with 
a strong centralized government during the pr liminary talk for the 
establishment of the Arab League. Moreover, Syria did not object to 
the idea of Greater Syria, in principle, when the subject was raiaed in 
the Preparatory Committee. The Syrian objection was direct d against 
the peraon of King Abdullah, and the Greater Syria scheme was attacked 
on the ground that it was British-inspired. Thus the Syrian and Leb-
anese object to a union that would indirectly bind th m to treaty with 
Great Britain, which they p rticularly eriticize. 25 Moreover, the 
Syrian and Lebanese attacked the constitution of Transjordan and the 
26 
unlimited powers of King Abdullah. 
24Greater Syria, Damascus, 1947, p. 13. 
Considering the factors behind Lebanon's attitude toward the Greater 
Syria scheme, George Lenczowski, in "The Middle latt in World Politics," 
said: "Lebanon's relations with her Arab neighbour• continu d to be 
COi.lditioned by two factors: (1) her essenUally Arab ch racter as a 
nation, and (2) the preponderance of the Chriatian element in her popu-
lation. While the first factor pushed Lebanon into cooperation with the 
Arab atatea through the inatrumentality of the Arab League •••• the second 
acted as a brake on the pro-Arab tendencies and dictated to the little 
republic a cautious course that would permit her to maintain her inde-
pendence and individuality. It was thia second facet of Lebanese policy 
which led her consistently to oppose the Greater Syria schemes •.•• as 
well as to insist on the retention of full sovereignty by the members 
of the Arab League." P. 250. 
25After the declaration of Transjordans independence, an Anglo-Transjor-
dan Treaty was concluded which acured aome privileges for Britain in 
Transjordan. 
, Damascus, 1947, p. 54. 
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The matter was fin lly raised at the council of the Ar b L gu 
by th Syrian delegation . In order to solve th controversy, it was 
affirmed that the m ntion of Gr ater Syri . did not imply an infri ge-
nt on the indep nd nc of ny particular rnb r tat • The council 
one more confirmed the obligation of every member tate to r pect the 
27 
over ignty of the others. 
The Greater Syria controv ray reflected the dyn atie riv lry 
among the member states of the ArabLe gue, as Saudi.· Arabi and Egypt 
stood firmly by the id of Syri and L.banon in opposin ~ing AbdullaH 
ambitiou plan , while Ir q, the other H shimite kin d m, w a fav rin 
Tr nsjordan's claims . 
King Abdullah ' s failure to chieve his Gr e t r Syria ache and 
the opposition that he faced from th member states of the Arab League, 
except Iraq, prompted him to approach the latter for achievin closer 
relations b tween th two H shimite kingdoms in order to atr ngthen 
their poeition in th rab Le gue. 
Conversations b t een Iraq and Transjordan, to achieve this end , 
began arly in 1946 and culminated in the conclusion of a "Tre ty of 
Allianc and Broth rhood" between the two Hashimite k1ngdoms. 28 The 
Tr aty provided for close alliance and eternal brotherhood between 
t t wo ar tie • The preambl stated that th s curity, cooper tion, 
27Gre ter Syria , p. 54. 
28This Tre ty c into force on June 10, 1947. 
found in The Middle last Journal, October, 1947, 
The text is to be 
pp. 449-451. 
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and compl te mutual understanding on matters aff ctin the i ter t 
of ~h - two countri e w re th purpos of the t r aty. 
Sine~ its establishment , the Ar b League h made the Pale tin 
queation there pon · ibility of 11 the ~mb r statea. nnex· I of th 
Pact of the Leagu w3 · devot d to the P lestin questi n . ef rrin to 
the Coven~nt of the Le gue of ations and th Tre ty of Lau ann --the 
former made provi$ion for a regi bssed .upon ~ cognition of her inde-
p ndence in which· th l tter proclaimed that her futur ua to be 
ettled by the parties conce.ned--Ann~~ 1 of t h P ct concluded that 
Pal. tine should be independent . 
The immedi t goals of the Leagu concerning Pale tin at that 
time ·Jer to top mas ! i gration of Je a to P le tine; to preoerve 
Pal stinian land by prohibiting the selling of land to Zi ni ts, and to 
boycott the Zioni t ' production. These objectives were di$cus at 
the council' meeti1g of th Arb Le4gue in Blud n, Syria, Jun , 1946. 
At t'1c ond of the m tin , th council' a decision provided for: the 
establi nt of speci l co ittee to be called the P le tin c 
mitte to oupervis all activiti s rel~ting to l stine; a P l 
Action again t selling of lande to Zionists; the eatablie nt of a 
sp ciul fund for Pal stin ; nd an organiz d and extended propagand . 29 
The e r solution \Jar~!! follOYed by an Arab State ' mor ndum 
s nt to the British and American Governments to protest the report of 
the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry which had be n sent to inveati-
g t the Palestine problem. 30 
29ror text of these recommendations see the (London) Times, June 14,1 
30ror te t of the report see th R ~York Times, 1, 1946. 
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Britain, which could not find a solution for the Palestine question 
that would be accepted by both Arabs and Zionists, requested the calling 
of a special session of the General Assembly on April 2, 1947 to con-
aider the problem. The General Assembly set up a special Committee on 
Paleatine (UNSCOP) which recommended to the Assembly the Partition of 
Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state with an economic union between 
them. 
The council of the Arab League convened at Alley, Lebanon, on 
October 6, 1947 to consider the Palestine situation in the light of the 
recommendation of the U. K. Committee and the British announcement of 
its plan to withdraw from Palestine by May 15. 1948. 
At the last meeting the council announced ita resolutions con-
cerning Palestine, the most important of which were: 
~ •.•• in view of the Britieh declaration of ita intention to 
evacuate Palestine and in view of the terrorist organisation and 
Zionist forces which threaten the security of Palestine Arabs, 
it ie recommended that military precautions be taken on the 
boundaries of Palestine by adjacent states, provided thoae states 
make arrangements for the participation of other states. 
It is recommended that actual help, both materially and 
morally, be given Palestine Ar bs to strengthen their defense 
and that each Arab state set aside funds for that purpose and 
that a special committee be appointed to superviae the funds . "31 
Hardly had the League ended its meetings when it was called again 
for a special session to study the situation after the U. R. had 
adopted the partition plan on November 29. The council met again for 
three days and announced that the League would supply (1) arms and 
31The resolution, composed of three parte, may be found in the Mew York 
Times, October 7, 1947. 
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subsidies to irregulars; (2) r gular armies t o help out whil Brit in 
wa still in Pal estine, but which would take action when the British 
evacuated; (3) rai i ng of $4,000 ,000 by the member states for th 
32 irregular army. 
Th League's hopes th t th volunteer army would be able t o 
occupy Pale tine wer shattered by the events prec ding th t rmination 
of the mandate . Streams of Arab refugees left their homes as a result 
of Zioni st terrorism and sought shelter in neighbouring Arab states. 
Public opinion rose to a high pitch in the Arab Wor ld against their 
governments' non-intervention. Under the pressure of mounting public 
op inion, th Arab regular forces moved into Palestine at dawn on May 15, 
1948. 
Thus the Palestinian war started on May 15, 1948 and the first 
phase lasted twenty-seven days, until June ll. This was followed by a 
truce of one month . The •eeond phave of fighting, which b gan on 
July 8 , lasted eleven days until July 19, 1948 and was ended with the 
League's failure to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel 
and the liber ation of Palestine . The L9ague was never able to organize 
a general war to liberat Pale tine and its military and diplomatic 
effort were defeated. The very nature of th internal structure of 
t he League made such a task impossible; i t posaessed neither the ad-
mini strative machinery nor the necessary powers to coordinat e and con-
trol t he various armies of the member statea . 
3~ w Yor k Times , December 16, 1947. 
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reover, the Palestin quection ~as a seriou probl m th t the 
Arb Le gue h d to deal with. It should. b mentioned in this respect 
th t the Arabs had baen at disadvent ge owing to their ignorance of 
international politics nd the general overall weakn~as of their posi-
tions as a r sult of years of miarule and oppres ion . 
The general condition of weaknes& of the Ar b state nd their 
dependence on the big pow rs put the League from the outa t in a itua-
tion that could hardly be considered very hopeful. 
It is true that th r w s a great e l of solidarity, or ahow of 
solidarity, in the initial st ge of th. Palestine conflict; but soon 
th~ dyna tic rivalry prevented the League from t king any concert d 
33 
action in th struggle with lara 1. 
It was imposaible, owing to tha dyna tic rivalry, to reach an 
agreem nt for a united command. Xing Abdullah announced th t he would 
be the Commander-in-Chief, but n ither the Egyptians nor the Syrians 
accepted him as uch. As a result, there was no coordinated Arab 
strategy, and the mov mente of the Arab forces were as much dictated 
by the political rivalrie inside the Arab League as by military con-
34 
sider. tion . 
In the meantime, di cord w s aven more rife on th question of 
the statu of th futur Palestine otate . King Abdullah, supported by 
Iraq, which had no imm diat interests in Pal atine av~ the larger 
interest of resisting Zionis t claims, advocated the annex tion of 
33Khadduri, Independent Irag, pp. 258-259 . 
34~imche, Jon, Seven Fallen Pillars, Fredrick A. Prager, New York, 
1953 • 242. 
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Pale tin to Tr n jo4d n a~ a fir t s t p i th r .li tion of the 
G cstGr Syri pl an. But th oppo ition of the oth r A~~b at t ~ore d 
. in3 Abdull h t o agr t o the Ar. b Lcagu ~ solution (April, 194 ) t hat 
t h f t of P l e tin , fter her lib r tion , should b d cid d by t 
P Ll tini ns thernaelv •35 Wh ·n th Ar b stat f il d to ave Pales -
tine , in bdul l h con ider d t h rob League council' r e olution no 
ltJnger binding and he r :~ri d :lis aims for th nne• atio of th Ar b 
p· rt o f alMtin~ . Thus, hen tht; "Arab Gover nt of All Pal otine" 
wns form d t Croz~a nt t he i n tnnc of t he Arab Lea u. , all t he Arab 
gta t eo, with Abdullah' exception, recogni~ed it . reover, in a ve 
ag~in t the expr sed de ir of 11 the ot her Ar tatea, King Abdul 
h d proc lai d hims .1 £ ing of J rus lem in the latter part of 1948 . 
A meetin • of the Arab L~agu hnd b n called at th time and h had 
36 b en thr tened 1ith expul 1 n . 
Th. rnb states hich lu recognized t he gov rn ent of All Arab 
Pale tin could not a.ccept lting Abdull h 'a action . H h d con nted 
to drop the is ue of anne~stion for the tim bein , but n v r did 
accept th Crozza gov nunent whic:h he h l ooke u n a a pupp .t of 
lgypt . . 
Th climax of the sequ nc . of vent~ th t al t brought a rupture 
ithin the Leagu wa t he d c! ion of .ing Abdu11Qh t dd t o his k ing-
dom hi oceupi d p rt of PQl tin . The for. 1 ct of unit y t oo place 
35Khadduri, The Schem o~ Fertile Creacent Unity , p . 155. 
36 Ximch, op, cit. , p . 307 . 
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when Jorrlan 's P r:Uament voted th .unification of Arab Pal Stine and 
Trans ord n int o the sin le kingdom of Hashimite Jordan. Thi action 
1n ad f!anc of t h . Le gu council's dec~~ion of April, 1948 con-
37 
c min th~ future of Pnlestine. 
Th council of t h Ar b Le~gue met on June 12 t o decide upon the 
neces nry punit-ive me oure~ to be applied assinst Jord n . efu ino: to 
ttend th meeting, Jord n off r d no comp~omise on the !s u of ~nnexa-
38 
tion . Trying t o avoid r uptur , roong the member c.otate , Iraq eug-
tee that th icsue houl~ be referr d to the Politic l Co i tt e 
'hich rou~ d di cusv and r co ,nd but could not decide, 39 
Th. Po litic~! Co it t , in ita re~olution, emphasized that all 
tt r. concerning P le tine ~ould be depend nt upon the acceptance of 
a l l Arab League ot te and unt i l ouch ti a there could bo a final 
p ~ tin s ttlemant. Th r~oolution recognized Jorden ' s position in 
Palestine a trust: e uhieh nhe shou1~ relinqu! h in case an Ar.:tb 
in orne form ohould b r t or . d in th 40 futur • 
Thi settlement wao consider ed as a. 1ong-t rm pootponement of the 
i u at that time . 
The outcome of e ento in Palestine and the developing consequences 
of the L ague' action in t hat re5pect have expo d the intrineic weak-
n. es of t he League syatem. 
37The ew York Times , April 25 , 1950. 
38tbid ., .June 13, 1950 • 
l 9tb:td. J Jun 13, 1950. 
40Ibid ., June 15, 1950. 
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The League's failure to save Palestine had a deep reaction among 
the Arab peoples. They lost confidence in their rulers and felt that 
the League could not afford security to the Arabs in the face of a new 
Israeli push. The political instability in the Arab World after the 
Palestine crisis was beat revealed in the events thattook place in 
Syria in 1949. In that year Syria witnessed three euccessive military 
41 
coup d'etats. 
After the League's disaster in Palestine, the Arabs of the Fertile 
Crescent, aware that they were directly exposed to the danger of a re-
newed Zionist aggression and the incapability of the League to atop 
such an aggression, began once more to look into the poseibility of a 
closer unity in the Fertile Crescent within the framework of the Arab 
42 League. 
Since the Greater Syria plan advocated by ~ing Abdullah failed to 
rally a strong eupport among the Syrians, Iraq decided to come to the 
43 fore to le d such a movement. 
The opportune moment to achieve a Syrian-Iraqi unity offered it-
self after the first Syrian coup d'etat and the defeat of ~tli 
regime which wa in opposition to such a union. On April 1, 1948 the 
Iraqi Prime Minister Muri as-Said, who for long had played with the 
idea of a Fertile Crescent untty, began to approach Husni al-Zaim, · 
41 -- -The first was Husn± al-Zaim'a coup d'etat, March 30, 1949; the second 
was Hinnawi's coup d'etat, August 14, 1949; and the third was 
Shiahakli'a coup d'etat, December 19, 1949 . 
42Under Article 9 of the Pact it was possible for the member states to 
have closer ties than· are provided by the Pact. 
431hadduri, The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity, p. 156. 
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the le der of the first Syrian coup d' tat, for the possibility of 
Syrian-Ir qi union. Zatm's reply to ~uch a gesture wa1 neouraging. 
H mad it cl ar that Syria was des irout of a unity with Iraq and re-
quested Iraq to conclude iiDDiedistely a defensiv milit ry agreement 
44 
with Syria . The e moves impelled gypt and Saudi Ar bia , which were 
against a Syrian-Iraqi union , to swift action. Saudi Ar bia and lgypt, 
which until that time did not recognize Zaim's regime, promised formal 
recognition and immediate financial support if Zaim ould maintain , 
. 45 
Syri 's r epublic n r gime. Anxiou to ecure formal di lomatic 
nition , Zaim ace pt d the Saudi-Arabi n and Egyptian off r and rejected 
any closer political union with Iraq . 
44Khadduri, The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity, p . 157. 
Cons ide ring Zaim' s cooper at ion with the Haahimi tea ltingdoms, Geor.ge 
Lenezowski. in The Middle East in World Affair·s ~ , said: "Ideological 
and practical eon iderationa pu bed htm toward the cooperation with 
Iraq and Jordan advocated by Pan-Ar b groups. There was also a com-
pelling need to accept their military and at th time of th armistice 
negot iations with Israel. Such aid was likely to strengthen Syria's 
position and guarant e h r protection against th threat of an Israeli 
invasion . Furthermore, if Zaim's pledges for reform were not to remain 
an empty word, they had to be b eked up .by some quick steps toward 
economic r ecovery •••• Iraq and Jordan were Syria's two principal 
cu tomers •..• Therefore, expan ion of trade with th m 1l10uld be a basic 
factor in Syria's economic recovery." Pp. 252-253. 
Also Kimche . op. cit., pp. 310-311. 
45tbid., p . 157. 
Also ltimche, op. cit., p. 311. 
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However, th econd Syri n coup of Hinna1i off r.d Ir q nother 
opportunity tore um negotiationQ for~ Syrian-!r~ 1 union . Hinn i' 
coup was support d by th J?eopl 1 P .... r t y ~ hich dvoc .. t d a Syr! n-Ir q:l 
union . 
With the support of the P ople ' P~rty, Hinn ~i 
policy o£ friendship with ypt an Saudi Arabia and reo en d negot i -
46 tion with Iraq for a clos r politic l union. 
Although the Peopl s' P3.rty, which upport d clo r unity with 
Iraq, beca the large t single p rty in the Con ·titu nt Ass ly in 
the election of Novemb r, 1949, ther were some element who oppoaed 
such a unity. Th Republican Bloc nd the Ba'th Party , which opposed 
a Syrian-Iraqi union , made secret contacts wi th a 1umb r of army 
officer who , though having coop rated wi.th Hinnawi to get rid of Zaim, 
did not Qceept hie policy of union with Iraq . The 1 d r of this 
ecr t move wae Adib 1-Shishakly who thre off Hinn wi ' s regi by 
nother coup d 'et t on December 19 , 1949. Thus the whole army, under 
47 
a new co!ID!lnd , changed its. policy on the que tion ·of unity with Iraq. 
Shishakly ' s coup put Syr! in a paradoxical oituati n. Whi l e the 
army and it supporter in the Con tituent Assembly were opposed t o 
Syri n- Iraq.i union, the Peoples' Party . the only large party in th 
Assembly, remained eo itted to ultimate union with lr q and openly 
opposed Shiahakly.48 
46Lenczowaki, G orge, The Middl East in World Affaire, Cornell Uni-
versity Press , 1952, p. 255 . Also ~imc:he , op. cit., p. 315 . 
47Knadduri, Th Scheme of Fertile Crescent Uni ty, pp . 163-164 • 
• 315. 
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Ho\Jever , with the tnt rferenc:e of th~ army, the project of Syrian-
l uqi union. was put side . It should be noted that although opposition 
t o ouch .,. proJec,t came from some .of the political circles in Syria, 
nevertheless this opposition was backed and supported by Saudi Arabia 
and Bgypt. 
By thi tim • !gypt had announced her intention of initiating a 
49 proposal for a collective security pact. 
The "Treaty of Joint Defense an4 conomic Cooperation," proposed 
by gypt:, wns adopted in Jtme, 1950 by Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, 
Syri , and Yaman. Iraq withheld her s ignature for technical reasons, 
50 
as has been xplain d at the time. 
This rreaty came into force on August 23, 1952 following the aig-
nature of Iraq. on February 2, 1951 and that of Jor dan on February 16, 
1952. 51 
The Treaty reproduced to some extent the legal pattern of NATO. 
. ' . 
Under Article 2 the Treaty provided for an automatic collective securi 
ystem: in caae of a gression, the member states would come to the aid 
of the vic tim and would take all availab le measures, including the use 
49r or Egypt's attitude, see New York ·Times, May 17, 1950. 
Considering Egypt's attitude, lthadduri, in The Scheme of Fertile 
Crescent Unity, said: "The lgyptian proposal of an Arab collective 
security pact, to be signed by all the Arab League states in order to 
protect them from Zionist danger, was in fact designed to disrupt the 
Syria-Iraqi unity scheme which was advocated by Syrians who sought 
security from Zionism through such unity." P. 166. 
50 ew York Times, June 17 , 1950. 
51ror text see The Middle East Journal, Spring, 1952, pp. 238~240. 
The Treaty consists of 13 articles and a military annex. I~ is valid 
for ten years. 
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of armed force, tor p 1 th · ggres ion. Articl 6 prov:ded for the 
e tsbli hment ·of a Joint Defens Council, eornpo ed of the oreign and 
D .fen Ministers of t participating s t ates. rticlc 8 provided for 
thee t blishment of an Economic Council; consi ting of t he. Mlniatera 
o£ conomic Aff ir , t o organiz and coordinat th inter-Arab economic 
Articl 10 st t d that th · contr dieting at te ould not und rtake to 
eonclude any internat i onal gr menta hich might b contradictory to 
the provisions of this Treaty, LllOr to act in a way which might b 
contrary to it ai 
It should b not d that the conclusion of this Treaty among th 
ember tates of th . Ar b Le· ue was in reapon e to the deeire among 
the Arab p. ople for a trong r unity than provided in the Pact of the 
Arab Le gue. Evid ntly th f ilure of Arab unity as delineat d by 
ppar nt to veryon cone rned. Th d sir for 
an .ff e ti re Arab unity togeth6r with the quest for security , owing to 
the pr nt itu tion of the Arab World , ha induced th member state 
o f th · Ar~b Le u to ee clo r ond tronger union. 
Before th "Treat of Joint Defens and conoaic Cooperation" 
came into force, azim al-Kudsi, the Syri n Pri Minister, submitted 
to the Politic l COl!l!litte · ;·of the Arab League .£n J nuary, 1951, a 
m morandum in which he urg de eloser union among the Arab states. 52 
Al- udsi ' plan, which pointed to the ineffectiveness of the Arab 
League in ite present form a~d the peoplea impatienee with ita slow 
52Mew York Times, January 20, 1951 . 
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ways and unsubstantial reaults, atressed the urgent need for an effec· 
tive Arab union. 53 The Prime Minister of Syria proposed a federation 
or a union that would include all the member states of the League. 
The union would have a common foreign and defenae policy, together with 
a unified economy. 
In his memorandum, al·Kudsi stressed the urgency of the situation 
and the threat of Zionism which constitutes a more imminent danger than 
any other. Al·Kudsi's proposal , though it did not materialize, was one 
of the basic factora that haatened the coming into force of the "Treaty 
of Joint Defense and lconomic Cooperation." 
Having been established with the main purpose of forming a bloc 
of Arab states strong enough to withstand outside presaure, the League' 
immediate concern was directed toward the political issues. 
However, on the social, economic, and cultural plane, the Arab 
League laid down more ambitious programmes which, if they could be 
carried out, would have more far-reaching significance in achieving 
54 Arab solidarity than ita political activities. 
In the economic and social fields actual achievements are few, 
but a groundwork has been laid which may well bear fruit in the future . 
The special committees of the League55 have been working on an ambit 
programme for the extension of regional commerce and the unification of 
53tzzeddin, op. cit., pp. 334-335. 
541badduri, Independent lraq, p. 259. 
Article 2 of the Pact of the Arab League provided for economic, 
social, and cultural cooperation. 
55These Committees were provided for in Article 4 of the Pact. 
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communications; the formation of customs and postal unions; th eatab-
liahment of a common citizenship; and the etand rdization . of 1 gal 
practices and educational systems. 
It is true that these proj ects have been carefully studied, but 
very few h ve reached the atate of practical application. 
However, there are some who beli ve that the League can r alize 
many achievements in the non-political fie lda . Consid~ring this posei-
bility, Charles Malik said: 
"But regardless of ii:s political limitation , the Arab 
League can play a more active role in the economic, cultural, 
and social life of the Arab World. There is ample room for 
the coordination of the energies of the various Arab countries 
in the socio-economic realm, nor ia sueh inter-Arab cooperation 
aa likely to be handicapped by the various internal and external 
f ctors of disunity as is the strictly political cooperation."56 
It hould be noted that eome tangible results alre dy have been 
achieved in the cultural fi ld, where the impreae of a common heritage 
i 57 still strong. 
56Malik, Charles, "The Near last: The Search for Truth," Foreign 
Affairs, January, 1952, p. 241. 
57considering the achievements in this field, J, Schacht, in '~ill 
There Be an Arab Federation?" said: .. The moet promising line of action 
would seem to lie for the moment on the cultural rather than on the 
economic or the formally political plane. To promote and strengthen 
the cultural ties between the Arab countries ia one of the principal 
aims of the pre•ent Arab movement, and the remarkable success which 
had lre dy been achieved in this field is being seriously exploited 
and developed by all parties concerned. The new Arab renascence aeema 
destined to provide a sound cultural basis for any future political 
dev lopment," Great Britain and the East, September 25, 1943, p. 19. 
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A cultur 1 Tr aty as adopted by all the . mber statea in 1945. 
Th ima of this treat y w re th int grat i on of th ducational sys -
t ms in t he Arab countri s, tho advancement of learning, and the de-
velopment of a uniform cultur. ba ed on the Arab heritag and nriched 
by th achievements of mod rn knowledge; 
Th economic, social, nnd cultural cooperation b tween th Ar ab 
League stat , t hough carri d out on limit d sc le, are a promi ing 
tep towar ds achieving th ult imate goal·-Arab Unity. 
CHAPT!R V 
CONCLUSION 
An indefinite idea, an irresolute course, and an unknown destiny! 
Thus so far the Odyssey of the Arab idea--but only so far--for t 
is yet more to come. Less than half a century old it has not as ye~ 
traversed its infant years, and the world-wthe Arab World in which it 
moves and has its being--is malleable and changing. ltl future is still 
in the unfathomable depths of Time. 
But already apparent--embedded in the very circumatanc s that 
attended ita birth and growth--are the mor or leas permanent factors 
that more than any other thing urge it on (or impede it) in its un-
ch rted path and towards it1 elusive fate. 
Let us seek these factors out. 
I. Birth of the Idea: Its Origin 
It is clear from Chapter I that the idea of Arab unity is 
rooted deep in the past, in the forces and procea1es released by the 
dynamism of Islam. Islam created the community of feeling, the 
coumon view of life, and the one heritage that today uphold and 
nourish the Arab idea. The idea, however, did not grow out of Islam 
In fact, it could ~ have grown out of it, for the national idea is 
to a certain extent, alien to the very premise of Islam. It is much 
too narrow for the univer1alism that is Islam • 
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The impulse came from the outside. Chapter II points to at 
least three alien forces. I he first is the flow of Western ideas 
- ----- ------~ 
in th latter part of the nineteenth century into the then isolated 
and self-contained Arab Society. This was later to be followed by a 
- ---
W stern occupation which gave further impetus to the idea. The 
~ • .:.:..~ !.mpellinl{. force _w~• the attempt -.~-~.~~·fie~tion that e._ '2) 
in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. This sharpened 
the c;:onaciousnese of a separate and distinct Arab identity. Finally 
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came_.....the intrusi~n- ?f ~i_onism into the Arab Ba_s~ an_d the_ tragedy of ) 
Palestine, which drew the Arabs together more than ever before. 
The fact that the Arab idea did not grow out of Islam and is to 
some extent antagonistic to it, might partly explain why the idea 
baa so far not evoked among many Arabs any undue enthusiasm. The 
dependence of the idea on outside impulses indicate• that its in-
tensity in the future will partly be in more or leas direct propor-
tion to th pressure of outer forces. This does not mean that when 
the idea starts rolling in earnest it will not pick up force under 
its own momentum and draw upon the more positive inner resources 
that Islam baa unwittingly provided. 
II. Growth of the Idea 
A. Its Scope and MObility 
The Arab idea baa been unueually elastic, and in ita move-
ment through the years, changes in it or in relation to it are 
distinguishable along at least four lines. 
1. Firat, there have been ahifts in ita center• of gravity. 
These have chang d roughly ae follows: 
1880-1914: Syria 
1914•1818: Th Ha he ites in Hejaz 
1918-1920: The Haehemit s in the Fertile Crescent 
1920-1940: Thi is the p riod of what might b call d the 
"paralysis" of the idea, when the rertil Cr ac nt 
was torn into zonee of French and British influe1ncc~n 
and each Arab area frittered its strength away 
individual £fort at independence; and when on 
surf ce the idea seemed to have p t ered out. With 
the defeat of Franc in 1940 the idea came into 
its own again. 
a. On the official level 
1940-1944: The Hashe ites in Jordan nd Iraq 
1944: Egypt nt rs th picture for the firet time. 
1944-1948: Egypt takes the lead. 
1949-1955: A tug-of-war between Saudi-Arabian, Egyptian, 
and Hashemite Centers. with Egypt still in th 
lead. 
b . On the popular l vel 
1940-1955: Syria continuss to be the moat potent source of 
pure, unadulterated Arabism. 
The above should xplain why some Arab countries, as those 
in the Fertile Cr scent and Syria in particular, are more enthu-
siastic about Arab unity, while other like the Bgyptiana, to 
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whom the id•a meant little or nothing at all before 1944, are 
at be t lukewarm toward• it. 
2. Secondly, there have been shifts in terms of the aocial groups 
or elaes.es which adhered to the idea. Its range of appe l, in 
fact, has been conatantly lddening. It started in the lat 
1900's with a very narrow circle of Syrian intellectuals and 
notables . In the 1910's the Hashemite rulers» for purposes of 
their own, embr ced it. From then on it b ca gradually th 
possession of an increasing number of middle class elements in 
the Fertile Crescent, particularly in Syria and l as so in 
Iraq, and it is only now that it has begun to seep into the 
mass levels. In other Arab areas the idea has not y t gained 
root among the intellectuals, but the continued appeal to the 
idea of the rulers of Egypt. Iraq, Saudi~Arabia. tc. in their 
jockeying for position in the Arab World indicates that the 
idea is sinking deep into the imagination of a large part of 
the Arab popul tion. 
3. Thirdly, there h ve ben shifts in t rms of the area which th 
id a has for ite focus. In the late nineteenth century it 
centered on natural Syria. In the 1910's it laid claim to the 
ntire Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Penineula. In the 
1920's with the destruction of the Hashemite power i n the 
Peninsula the ar a of th idea contracted ag in. Wh n ita 
official revival came in the early 1940's. it was at:l.ll limi 
to the Fertile Cre c nt. Wh n, however s it received ita first 
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concrete expression in the Arab League. its area was enlarg d 
to include Egypt and the larger part of the Peninsula. Mean-
while , on the popular level in Natural Syria it came increas-
ingly to be associated with the Greater Arab ar a extending 
from the Atlantic Ocean to Iran. 
4. Finally, there have been shifts in term. of the political 
principle upon which the idea was to be built. In this sens • 
it oscillated between th unitary, federal. and confaderal 
~-·· .... - ·;,...,. ~--- t.o., .-._ - .. ~ ........ 
forms of government. Why so far it ended in the loose and 
unworkabl e association that is the Arab League ia explained by 
obstacles that faced it and which will be presently consid red. 
B. Factors Hindering the Idea 
There are a number of reasone why the Arab idea has not so 
far gained way in the Arab lands. Different weights could be 
attributed to theee reasons. Among the more ealient ones are: 
l . The Arabs inhabit very wide area fragmented geographical ly 
,_------,..--.. - ....... ~ . ....... ~ .• ,...-~. , ,.....,._.._,..._, .. , •. , ,..,~!kt" o:"'"'·• 'U.e,. ~, , ... , • -.c...o:• - iiilll. •• .,., ":'t,.· : r: • '.- .,.,...,..,..,_._ 
by intervening deserts, so that in the paet , with absence of 
~-~~ ................. - .•... 
easy communication, the Arabs of the different regions were . 
virtually isolated from each other. This meant severe re• 
striction on the mobility of the Arab idea. MOdern means of 
communication have annihilated distance to such an extent that 
· they form today a positive ass~t to Arab unity. 
2. The fact tlult the Arab idea had tended to move in the past 
largely among a narrow circle of the ruling elements has given 
. '• ' I• • ·~,-..,~,. • I ',.~ '' ' .l" .'·",t ' ;'I ' • ' • • '•' · ~ .... •._, ,, ', 1 ' ·• :! ··~ 
undue w ight to dynastic quarrels in ita destiny. In fa~t, 
_ ..-.~--~--·--- · ·· -· .... .-:.-' ···· 
'.,-\ ...... 
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th ide so far has b en th victim of irreconcilable ambi tions 
of Kings, Emirs, and ~ashas and their satellit The an•~~~·an 
d cline of this r bble of rulera and the ris ing consciousness 
of the ma es p~omiae al o to negate thi 
in the not too diatant futur • 
3 . ?robably th gr ateat obat cl of aU is tbe presence today in 
the Arab World of other .. ide s ,l;J;l~.tr e~p~:t severely_ for the 
. ·' ·- -"" -,.,,__.. . ~ -·· • ·•· ,.;, J:.-.··. ! •'or• ·-•··' _. .~, ..,...;. , . .. "f.,,.' 
... --• • <.•A• • ,~ <',.-1 ,.., • . , ,.,.._, • 
loyalty of the Arab mind. Ther ie first what w might call 
.. ···- _,. ':: ... _ 
t he regional idea••Egyptianiem, Syrianismt Iraqtsm, or th 
~
lik • Such concepti are naturally antagonistic to the Arab 
ide · and detract from its force. These cone pts hold undi -
puted away in some ay; .a ~ like Egypt for instance, while they 
are weaker in other area , like Syria. There iG also another 
competing id a that ia a formidable if not mor eo. Thia i 
the Islamic id a which, with it perv live and universal view, 
appeal to an inc~ea ing number of Nor th African Arabs . Ther 
is alto the tribal idea . Many Arabs have not a yet tran-
scended tribal consciousness. Fo~tunat ly. how ver, this con-
ciousness is rapidly wearing out. Finally. tha~e is the 
Communist idea--an outer force--that ha . neverthelesa mad a 
deep dent among a numbor of intellectual , particul arly in 
Iraq. It is evidatt that the advance of the Arab idea in the 
futur will be in inverae proportion to th growth or decline. 
of theae competing idea• . 
4. Another obstacl is presented by the varied stages of politic 1 
and cultural development of the varioua Arab countries. 
Politically. some Arab countries are coloniea, others protec-
torates, others independent. Of the independent ones, aome 
republics, the others kingdoms. Some are patriarchal, oth ra 
are modern. Culturally also there has been wide_ ·divergence. 
-~·- . 
Some countries have been subjected to Western influence, others 
.~ .......... _____ ~ ___ ,_. .............. ,. . . ;. · ...... . .. , ·. .. . .. '-. . . -~. ~- :.... .. . .... . -.. .;;.. . . . 
not. For some areas this inftu ·nce has been potent, in others 
weak. In some it has b en of the British brand. in others of 
the French brand. Th result of all this ia a situation wher 
in oue Arab country, like Egypt. you have urbanization , the 
beginnings of industrialilm, the acceptance of a secular view 
of the state, whereas in another Arab country, like Saudi-
Arabia, the social organization if still tribal and Ialamie 
self-sufficiency il still affirmed. 
5. Another very important factor which acta in both directions 
is the interfer nee of foreign power• in the proces of Arab 
development. The most notab1e examples are, of course, the 
fragmentization of the Fertile Cre1cent after World War I and 
the Zionilt Wedge after World War Ii which separated th Arabs 
of Africa from the Arabs of Aaia . 
6. Finally, there are a numb r of other obstaclea-~as for in•~·~ww••n 
the religioua fi~§ure as between Shii or Suni, or MOslem or 
Chri tian ; or th racial fissure aa between Kurd and Arab, or 
Berb r and Arab. 
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Despite all these blocs , there yet remains a consciousn ss 
of common id ntity. nd a sen e of n common destiny. Other .. 
wise such a thing a~ the Arab League would have been incompre-
hensible . 
III . First Fruition of th Idea: The Arab League 
Two observations about the Arab League will be sufficient. 
lt deserves no more. 
A. That in the Jho.rt•range view it ha been a political setback to 
the idea of Arab unity becauee its purpose waa to preserve th 
statua quo, that is to say, to preserve division. It aimed not 
aa much at bringing the Arabs togeth•r as at perpetuating the 
. pow r of the Kings and Emirs who were ita members . It gave th 
Arabs an illusion of a unity and diver.t d them from a more cr at i 
pat h. 
B. However , from a long-term view, by l aying th groundwork, at 
least, for closer cultural and social coop ration, the Arab 
League Covenant ha• unwittingly worked towards undermining, the 
har d way, the very power structur e that it ought to preserve. 
IV. Future of t he Idea 
Thers are various possibilities of development . Eit her the 
idea will not progrees at all, bogging down somewhere. or it will 
forge ahead. If it does; it might take various forms•-poasibly the 
form o.f closer cooperation between the var:l.oua Arab governments. 
But this will not mean much tangibly becaus different rulers will 
alw y mean different interests . Another poasibility is a military 
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conqu t by one Arab country of' another, or the fu ion of s veral 
Arab countries. Thi means an Arab idea limited in ita concept and 
in ita cope because no on Arab country is militarily able to con-
quer ll the r st. There is alao the possibility, though now remote, 
of an Arab mass mov~ment with branches in all Arab comJ.triea slowly 
rising to power and giving perhaps the only creative expr ssion of 
the tru Arab idea. 
Which way things wil l turn out depends not only upon internal 
~ab fore 1 and the ability of the Arab idea to transcend all its 
ob tacles, but lao on the developm nt in th rest of th world--
on th movements of Zioniam, C011111unism, and the W st:, for th Arabs 
do not exist in isolation, but more so than any other nation ar in 
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